





Acquaintance with Colours:  






Michael Ernest Markunas 
UCL 












I, Michael Ernest Markunas, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my 
own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this 
has been indicated in the thesis. 
 
 





 In this thesis, I outline and defend an acquaintance response to the 
knowledge argument. The knowledge argument was first presented by Frank 
Jackson in “Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982). The argument seeks to demonstrate 
that physicalism is false. There have been numerous different responses defending 
physicalism, but which, if any, is sufficient, remains highly controversial and 
unsettled (Nida-Rümelin, 2015).  
 
 I focus on one particular response on behalf of the physicalist: the 
acquaintance hypothesis. Recently, Michael Tye (2009) has provided a very 
sophisticated account of the acquaintance hypothesis. Tye argues that a proper 
theory of knowledge by acquaintance provides a cogent response to the 
knowledge argument. Tye’s view is informed by Russell’s theory of knowledge by 
acquaintance, which distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge by description (1910-11), but nevertheless Tye provides a large-scale 
overhaul. Perhaps most importantly, Tye argues that a proper theory of 
knowledge by acquaintance requires a proper theory of perception, which Russell 
lacked.  
 
 While I agree with Tye that a proper understanding of knowledge by 
acquaintance provides the physicalist a way to response to the knowledge 
argument, I disagree that Tye himself has given us that understanding. I argue 
that his theory of acquaintance rests too heavily on a faulty theory of perceptual 
content. But rejecting Tye’s view does not force one to give up on the acquaintance 
hypothesis. Indeed, Tye seems on the right track in thinking that a theory of 
knowledge by acquaintance and a theory of perception are interdependent. To that 
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end, I attempt to construct a theory of perception that does justice to the theory of 
acquaintance. To do this, I rely on relationists (or sometimes called ‘naive realists’) 
theories of perception. I argue that an understanding of a relationist theory of 
perception provides the best grounds for a theory of knowledge by acquaintance, 
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Chapter 1: The Knowledge Argument 
1.1 Qualia and Physicalism 
The Knowledge Argument was first presented by Frank Jackson in his 1982 
paper, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”. It is an argument that purports to show that (i) 
qualia exist and (ii) physicalism is false. Before discussing the argument, I would 
like to begin by spelling out some of the details of the metaphysical view of 
consciousness that Jackson is trying to establish with the knowledge argument. In 
particular, I will elaborate on Jackson’s theory of qualia and physicalism. This will 
provide some context to better understand the knowledge argument itself.  
1.1.1 Qualia 
Jackson calls himself a “qualia freak”, and offers the knowledge argument 
as a “polemic” against those who deny qualia (Jackson, 1982). On Jackson’s theory, 
qualia are features of mental states that cannot be known by knowing all the physical 
information about that mental state. According to Jackson, qualia are most 
conspicuous in cases of bodily sensations:  
Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a 
living brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what 
goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be 
I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won’t have told me about 
the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches (1982, 127). 
While qualia may be most conspicuous in bodily sensations, they also occur in all 
perceptual experiences and at least some emotional states, at least according to 
Jackson (Jackson, 1982, 128). Consequently, we can give the following working 
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definition of Jackson’s theory of qualia: the features of some mental states which cannot 
be known by knowing all the physical information about that state.  
 Jackson thinks reflection on the nature of bodily sensations like pain and 
itchiness intuitively lends support to the belief in the existence of qualia. The 
knowledge argument is “polemic” because he thinks reflection on one’s 
experience is by itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence of qualia. The 
knowledge argument is only to convince the heretics, as it were, for the true 
believers of qualia need no such argument, for them it is just intuitively obvious. 
For instance, according to Jackson, if you reflect on an experience such as smelling 
a rose, it is intuitively obvious that what it is like to smell that rose is not 
information that can be acquired by knowing all the physical information about 
the rose (1982, 128). Thus, according to Jackson, knowing what it is like to have a 
certain experience is not something you can know merely by knowing all the 
physical information about that experience.  
 Discussions of experience are often couched in terms of ‘what it is like’, as 
in discussing ‘what it is like’ to hear Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9, ‘what it is like’ 
to taste vegemite, and ‘what it is like’ to see red. The locution ‘what it is like’ 
originates with Thomas Nagel (1974), and many philosophers since have used the 
locution to refer to qualitative aspects of experience (among other things).1 It is 
important to note at the outset that Jackson and Nagel have different conceptions 
of the nature of experience, and this can engender confusion when philosophers 
use the locution ‘what it is like’ to have a certain experience. 
                                                 
1  In the literature on conscious experience, ‘what it is like’ has been used in different ways by 
different philosophers to talk about different things. This somewhat engenders confusion as to 
what is at issue. For a discussion of the use (and abuse) of this locution see Snowdon (2010). 
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Jackson claims that he is not discussing qualia in terms of Nagel’s ‘what it 
is like’ properties. Jackson says that Nagel’s concern is with the total experiential 
state of a particular organism from a particular point of view. Thus, Nagel is 
concerned with what it is like to be a particular subject undergoing a particular 
experience, such as a bat navigating by sonar (Nagel, 1974). In a passage where 
Jackson elaborates on how he thinks his concerns differ from Nagel’s, Jackson says,  
When I complained that all the physical knowledge about Fred was not 
enough to tell us what his special colour experience was like, I was not 
complaining that we weren’t finding out what it is like to be Fred. I was 
complaining that there is something about his experience, a property of it, 
of which we were left ignorant (1982, 132).  
Jackson’s point is that what it is like to experience a certain thing from a certain 
point of view is not the same issue as whether or not there is a property of our 
experiences of which we are ignorant.  
The view Jackson attributes to Nagel might not be the most accurate and is 
perhaps open to debate. But what is important for our purposes is not how Jackson 
understands Nagel’s views of experience, but rather how Jackson demarcates his 
own view in contrast to Nagel’s view. Jackson thinks that a quale is a mental 
property of a subject. On Jackson’s account, seeing a red object is having an 
experience with a red quale. The experience is modified by the property of the red 
quale. This is the issue Jackson is concerned with. The experience’s quale may also 
affect what it is like to be a certain subject having a certain experience, but the issue 
of qualia are not themselves what it is like to be a particular individual, at least 
according to Jackson. 
Jackson’s metaphysics of experience seems more controversial than 
Nagel’s. If we adopt a conception of experience similar to Nagel’s, that is, if we 
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think of experience as having a viewpoint on a qualitative property like the redness 
of a strawberry, then it doesn’t seem too controversial that no amount of physical 
information, by itself, and from a third person point of view is necessarily going 
to tell someone what it is like to be someone else. To know what it is like to be 
someone else, you (plausibly) have to inhabit the person’s viewpoint. But this does 
not (at least not obviously) establish qualia or non-physicalism. What Jackson 
wants to show is not that what it is like to be a certain conscious subject cannot be 
known without inhabiting the subject’s viewpoint, but that there is a particular 
property of an experience which we cannot know by knowing all the physical 
information: 
One thing he knows is the way his experience of it differs from his 
experience of seeing red and so on, another is that he himself is seeing 
it…My complaint concerned the first and was that the special quality of 
his experience is certainly a fact about it, and one which physicalism 
leaves out because no amount of physical information told us what it is 
(Jackson, 1982, 133). 
So it is important to remember that the knowledge argument is about these mental 
properties—qualia—and our epistemic access to them. Discussions of ‘what it is 
like’ to undergo a certain experience are about something else, at least according 
to Jackson’s reading of Nagel. This is important because many philosophers to be 
discussed in this thesis switch back and forth between these two ways of talking—
qualia and ‘what it is like’—and it is not always clear which they mean. I will avoid 
the phrase ‘what it is like’ as much as possible, and when it is necessary to use it 
in discussing some other philosopher, I will flag the differences. In this way, we 
can do our best to avoid confusion and stay focused on the issue that Jackson 
himself was concerned about—namely the existence of non-physical qualia.  
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1.1.2 Physicalism 
The metaphysics of experience that Jackson defends is interdependent with 
how he views the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. Physicalism is standardly 
taken to be a metaphysical doctrine that everything that exists is physical or 
supervenes on the physical (Stoljar, 2015). Jackson however, is somewhat resistant 
to trying to define physicalism (1982, 127). The most direct statement he gives of 
physicalism is the following:  
Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is 
largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is entirely physical. This 
is why physicalists must hold that complete physical knowledge is 
complete knowledge simplicitier (1986, 291).  
As Jackson understands it, physicalism is a metaphysical doctrine with an 
epistemic consequence. He asserts physicalism is false because there are mental 
properties that are non-physical, i.e. qualia (Jackson, 1982, 1986). He argues that 
he can show that physicalism is false by demonstrating that no matter how much 
physical information we know, we cannot know about qualia (Jackson, 1982). This 
raises the question as to what Jackson thinks counts as physical information. 
For Jackson, physical information is a certain kind of information about our 
world and ourselves that is provided by the physical, chemical, and biological 
sciences (1982, 127). It includes not only the information given by these sciences, 
but also any information it is possible to infer from this information. For instance, 
take the example of a human being seeing a snake. I may know that the appearance 
of a snake to a human causes that human’s autonomic nervous system to be more 
active, causing their heart to beat faster and their skin to sweat more. Such 
activation of the nervous system may cause that human to run away if possible or, 
if not, reach for some object for defence. Thus, if I know object X, when experienced 
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by subject Y, results in a certain pattern of neuronal firing in the subject, pattern Z, 
which causes the subject to perform action A, then I can infer that a subject with a 
nervous system similar enough to a human will produce a similar response in 
relation to seeing a snake. Thus, information that can be inferred from physical 
information also counts as physical information in Jackson’s view. 
It must be noted that the physical information Jackson has in mind is the 
information given by the completed physical sciences of physics, chemistry, and 
biology. Obviously, we do not have that amount of scientific understanding yet. 
Nevertheless, Jackson thinks that all such information in the completed physical 
sciences, plus all inferences to be made from that information, would still not 
provide us with knowledge of qualia (Jackson, 1986).  
We should also note that there is something peculiar in the disciplines that 
Jackson chooses to demarcate the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. In talking 
of mental phenomena, it is strange that other sciences, for instance psychology, are 
not included in the list. Of course, Jackson is resistant to offering anything like a 
definition of physicalism and physical information because of the difficulties he 
thinks formulating such definitions bring:  
I do not mean these sketchy remarks to constitute a definition of ‘physical 
information’, and of the correlative notions of physical property, process, 
and so on, but to indicate what I have in mind here. It is well known that 
there are problems with giving a precise definition of these notions, and 
so of the thesis of physicalism that all (correct) information is physical 
information. (1982, 127).  
But even granting him his reservations, his choices seem to betray a certain picture 
of the world that we might find questionable. For what these “sketchy remarks” 
seem to “indicate” is a certain picture of the mind and its relation to the world. In 
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particular, it seems to suggest a Cartesian picture of the mind in which mental 
phenomena are separate from the physical world. Of course, this is what he argues 
for by presenting the knowledge argument. But by demarcating physicalism in the 
way he does, he seems to build into the set-up the metaphysical picture he is trying 
to establish.  
This does not mean that accepting or rejecting Jackson’s understanding of 
physicalism and physical information forces us to accept or reject the knowledge 
argument. We can perhaps reject Jackson’s set-up and yet still find the argument 
persuasive or vice versa. Nevertheless, it is something to note and be wary of.  
1.2 The Thought Experiment, The Argument, and the Responses 
 Jackson’s argument that physicalism is false is presented in the form of a 
thought experiment about Mary the super neuroscientist. The story is as follows: 
Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-
and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white 
television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the 
physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and 
our environment, in a wide sense of ‘physical’ that includes everything in 
completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to 
know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, 
including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all 
there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more 
to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism 
denies.…It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. 
For when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a colour 
television, she will learn what it is like to see something red, say. This is 
rightly described as learning—she will not say “ho, hum”. Hence 
physicalism is false. This is the knowledge argument against physicalism 
(Jackson, 1986, 291).  
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From this, we can lay out the argument as follows:  
Premise One: Mary knows all the physical facts about the world.  
Premise Two: If physicalism is true, then Mary knows all the facts about 
the world.  
Premise Three: When Mary sees colours for the first time she comes to 
know something new.  
Premise Four: What she comes to know is a new fact.  
Conclusion: There are non-physical facts in the world and physicalism 
must be false.  
 If Jackson’s goal was to be polemical, then he succeeded. The knowledge 
argument has elicited numerous responses from physicalists, but there is no 
consensus on which, if any, of these physicalist responses is successful (Nida-
Rümelin, 2015). One way to get a grip on this argument is to ask the following two 
questions (Ludlow et al., 2004). First, whether or not Mary, upon leaving her room, 
acquires new knowledge about the world. Second, what kind of knowledge that 
new knowledge is. Some physicalists try to block the knowledge argument by 
digging in their heels in and answering “No” to the first question—Mary acquires 
no new knowledge upon her release (Dennett, 1991). Most philosophers, 
physicalists included, find that answer hard to defend.2  Most think it virtually 
undeniable that Mary does in fact acquire some form of new knowledge upon her 
release (Ludlow et al. 2004). Consequently, physicalist responses to the knowledge 
                                                 
2  For a response to Dennett (1991), see Robinson (1993).  
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argument tend to focus on what type of knowledge Mary acquires when she sees 
colours for the first time.  
It has become somewhat standard to group the many physicalist responses into 
four categories (Ludlow et al., 2004). These categories can be described as follows: 
(i) the ability hypothesis (ii) the acquaintance hypothesis (iii) the phenomenal 
concept strategy and (iv) what I will call the “misdescription fallacy”, which 
questions whether it is an accurate description to say Mary knew all the physical 
facts in her black-and-white room. All four strategies reject one of the premises of 
the argument laid out above. In this thesis, I will be concerned only with the 
second option, the acquaintance hypothesis. However, to facilitate deeper 
understanding of the issues at play, I will briefly sketch out the nature of these 
four options below, before fully exploring the acquaintance hypothesis.  
 The Ability Hypothesis - Physicalists who embrace the ability hypothesis 
reject premise four, that when Mary sees colours for the first time she learns a new 
fact about the world. This view is famously defended by Laurence Nemirow (1990) 
and David Lewis (1990), among others. According to these philosophers, while it 
is true that Mary does acquire new knowledge when she is released, this new 
knowledge is not knowledge of facts (Lewis, 1990). Instead, what Mary acquires is 
the ability to recognize, remember, and imagine colours from a first person point 
of view. Lewis (1990) argues that these are abilities that cannot be acquired without 
experiencing colours. But these abilities are not knowledge of a new fact. Lewis 
argues that the distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how is vital to 
understanding the knowledge argument. Mary, according to Lewis, does not learn 
propositional knowledge of the form ‘that such and such is the case’, but rather 
knowledge of how to recognize, imagine, remember, and so on, colour 
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experiences. Thus, for Lewis, and other proponents of the ability hypothesis, the 
knowledge argument is unsound because there is an equivocation on 
“knowledge” between “knowledge-that” and “knowledge-how”. Accordingly, 
physicalists who embrace the ability hypothesis argue that while Mary does 
acquire new knowledge, this new knowledge is not knowledge of non-physical 
facts, but rather knowledge of a new ability. Consequently, the new knowledge 
she acquires is no threat to physicalism.  
 The Acquaintance Hypothesis- Similar to philosophers who embrace the 
ability hypothesis, philosophers who embrace the acquaintance hypothesis also 
reject premise four—that Mary learns a new fact (Conee, 1994; Tye, 2009). 
Furthermore, proponents of the acquaintance hypothesis also claim the 
knowledge argument is unsound because it equivocates on “knowledge” (Tye, 
2009). But unlike proponents of the ability hypothesis, who claim the equivocation 
is between knowing-that and knowing-how, proponents of the acquaintance 
hypothesis claim the equivocation is between knowledge by description and 
knowledge by acquaintance (Conee, 1994; Tye, 2009). The distinction between 
knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance goes back at least to 
Bertrand Russell (1910-11). Knowledge by description, according to Russell, is 
knowledge of truths. The truth that Paris is 105 km2 big is a truth I can know 
without myself measuring the size of Paris or even having ever been to Paris. By 
contrast, knowledge by acquaintance requires some kind of cognitive “contact” 
with the thing known. Knowledge by acquaintance cannot be acquired simply by 
knowing many descriptions about a thing.  
 One of the first defenders of the acquaintance hypothesis with respect to 
the knowledge argument was Earl Conee (1994). He argues that knowledge by 
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acquaintance is not knowledge of facts, nor know-how, but a third type of 
knowledge that requires only a “maximally direct cognitive relation to the 
experience” (1994, 197). According to Conee, the knowledge acquired is 
knowledge of a property. But knowledge of a property is not knowledge by 
description because it is not knowledge of a fact, but of a property. Thus, in her 
room, Mary knew the fact that red strawberries have the property red, but she did 
not have knowledge by acquaintance of that property because she had not yet seen 
red. So the knowledge Mary acquires when she firsts sees red is knowledge of the 
property itself, not knowledge of some fact. Accordingly, physicalists who 
embrace the acquaintance hypothesis argue that while Mary does acquire new 
knowledge, this new knowledge is not knowledge of a non-physical fact. Rather, 
it is knowledge by acquaintance of a physical item. Since the knowledge acquired is 
of a physical item, it is no threat to physicalism.  
 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy - In contrast to the two previous responses, 
the phenomenal concept strategy admits that the knowledge Mary acquires is 
knowledge of facts. Nevertheless, defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy 
think her knowledge is not knowledge of a new fact, but an ‘old fact in a new mode’ 
(Loar, 1990). Thus, they too reject premise four, that Mary learns a new fact about 
the world, but not because her learning is not factual, but rather, because it is not 
learning of a new fact. According to Loar, the essential point missed by Jackson is 
a difference between properties and concepts. Loar argues that phenomenal 
qualities are reducible to brain states, but phenomenal concepts are irreducibly 
first person: “phenomenal concepts are conceptually independent of physical-
functional descriptions, and yet pairs of such concepts may converge on, pick out, 
the same properties” (Loar, 1990, 227). What accounts for this is the difference 
between recognitional concepts and theoretical concepts. According to Loar, 
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phenomenal concepts are a subclass of recognitional concepts, which Loar 
conceives of as type-demonstrative (1990). In other words, they let the subject 
classify a particular thing as that thing or that kind of thing. They are essentially 
first person perspectival and rely on perceptual discriminations. So Mary gains a 
new phenomenal concept that is propositional knowledge—that is what red looks 
like—but this knowledge is not knowledge of a new fact, but a new way or mode 
of knowing an old fact. 
 The Misdescription Fallacy - The fourth type of physicalist response is given 
by those who claim that Jackson misdescribes physicalism. Daniel Stoljar (2001) is 
a recent defender of this approach. He argues that we should reject premise one of 
the knowledge argument because there is an ambiguity in the concept of 
“physical” between (i) the theory-based conception and (ii) the object-based 
conception. On the theory-based conception, a property is physical if it is either  
the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property 
which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property 
that physical theory tells us about (Stoljar, 2001, 312).  
By contrast, on the object-based conception, a physical property is either: 
the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature 
of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents, or else is a 
property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of 
property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of 
paradigmatic physical objects (Stoljar, 2001, 312). 
Stoljar argues that this matters because the class of properties picked out by the 
theory-based conception is not coextensive with the properties picked out by the 
object-based conception. The reason why is that physical theories pick out only 
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dispositional properties whereas object theories often pick out categorical 
properties. 
This brief summary of the responses was intended to provide background. 
The rest of the discussion will focus on the acquaintance hypothesis because I find 
it the most interesting and plausible refutation of Jackson’s knowledge argument. 
Moreover, it has been one of the least explored physicalist responses to the 
knowledge argument, despite the fact that the concept of conscious acquaintance 
has undergone something of a renaissance of late (Fumerton, Richard and Ali 
Hasan 2014). 
In the rest of this thesis, I examine Michael Tye’s version of the acquaintance 
hypothesis because it is one of the more sophisticated accounts in the literature. 
Moreover, I think there is much he gets right about how the acquaintance 
hypothesis can provide a physicalist response to the knowledge argument. In 
particular, I think the motivations Tye cites for adopting an acquaintance 
hypothesis are the right motivations. Ultimately though, I will argue that his 
attempt to work out how those motivations can play a role in perceptual content 
ultimately fails and undermines his theory of knowledge by acquaintance. I will 
then suggest an alternative theory of perception and argue that it fits better with 
the acquaintance hypothesis. The overall argument of this thesis is that, if we want 
to defend an acquaintance hypothesis to the knowledge argument, then we should 
adopt a relationist theory of perception.  
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Chapter 2: Michael Tye’s Acquaintance Hypothesis 
2.1 Introduction 
 Recently, Michael Tye (2009) has provided a sophisticated and lengthy 
discussion of the acquaintance hypothesis. He argues that understanding the 
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description 
provides the key to resolving many longstanding puzzles of consciousness, the 
knowledge argument among them. Though he begins his discussion of knowledge 
by acquaintance by discussing the views of Russell, Tye presents a very unique 
approach to the acquaintance hypothesis. Ultimately, I will argue his approach 
does not do justice to either the knowledge argument nor the acquaintance 
hypothesis. However, I think that in examining both what is right and what is 
wrong in Tye’s theory, we gain a deeper understanding not only of the 
acquaintance hypothesis, but also the initial appeal of the knowledge argument. 
 Let me begin my presentation of Tye’s views by restating the structure of 
the knowledge argument that I laid out in the previous chapter:  
 Premise One: Mary knows all the physical facts about the world. 
Premise Two: If physicalism is true, then Mary knows all the facts about the 
world.  
Premise Three: When Mary sees colours for the first time she comes to know 
something new.  
Premise Four: what she comes to know is a new fact.  
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Conclusion: There are non-physical facts in the world and physicalism must 
be false. 
As is true with other philosophers putting forth the acquaintance hypothesis, 
Michael Tye defends physicalism by rejecting premise four. He argues that there 
is an implicit assumption in the knowledge argument that we should reject. That 
assumption is that all knowledge is knowledge of facts. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, there are other physicalist responses to the knowledge argument that 
reject premise four. Indeed, philosophers who defend the ability hypothesis also 
reject premise four for a similar reason as acquaintance theorists, namely because 
there is an implicit assumption in the knowledge argument that all knowledge is 
knowledge of facts. But unlike those who advocate the ability hypothesis, 
acquaintance theorists do not argue that the new knowledge she acquires is know-
how. Rather, what Mary acquires is knowledge by acquaintance.  
 According to Michael Tye, knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge, not 
of facts, but of things:3 
Mary in her room knows all the physical facts about the subjective 
character of the experience of red. But there is a perfectly ordinary sense 
of ‘know’ under which she does not know the thing that is the subjective 
character of the experience of red. She is not acquainted with that thing. 
When she leaves the room and becomes acquainted with the phenomenal 
or subjective character of the experience of red, thereby she knows it. This 
is genuinely new knowledge, logically distinct from her earlier factual 
knowledge (2009, 131-132, my emphasis).  
                                                 
3  Following Tye, I will use the expressions (i) knowledge of things, (ii) thing-knowledge, and (iii) 
knowledge by acquaintance interchangeably. The meanings are equivalent and any variation is 
strictly for stylistic purposes.  
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Tye’s distinction between knowledge of things and knowledge of facts is a version 
of Bertrand Russell’s (1910-11) distinction between knowledge by acquaintance 
and knowledge by description. 4  Indeed, Tye argues that Russell’s distinction 
between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is the key to 
understanding many puzzles of consciousness, in particular the knowledge 
argument. But Tye does not uncritically accept Russell’s distinction and apply it 
to the knowledge argument. Rather, Tye thinks that, by itself, Russell’s distinction 
is insufficient: “what Russell needed when he advanced his distinction between 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description was a better grasp of 
the nature of perceptual content” (Tye, 2009, xii). According to Tye, knowledge by 
acquaintance needs to be supplemented with a theory of perceptual content, 
namely representational content that is non-propositional and non-conceptual: 
What needs to be appreciated is that knowledge by acquaintance of an 
entity is a kind of non-conceptual, non-propositional, thing knowledge. I 
know the shade red29 simply by being acquainted with it via my 
consciousness of it.…Our consciousness of things, both particular and 
general, enables us to come to have factual knowledge of them, but that 
consciousness is not itself a form of factual knowledge at all. It serves as 
the ground or warrant for beliefs about what we experience, but is not 
itself a kind of belief. Knowledge by acquaintance is the foundation for 
knowledge by description, but it is a completely different kind of 
knowledge (Tye, 2009, 135). 
For Tye, knowledge of things is a type of knowledge that is non-propositional and 
non-conceptual in form. In this way, it is a type of knowledge that is 
fundamentally different from knowledge of facts, which is propositional and 
conceptual. Knowledge of things does not consist in knowledge of facts, and, for 
that reason, it is not acquired by learning propositions. Tye believes that when 
                                                 
4  See especially Russell (1910-11, 1912, 1992).  
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Mary sees red for the first time she acquires new knowledge by acquaintance of 
red. This new thing knowledge is genuinely new knowledge about the world. But the 
new knowledge she acquires is not propositional knowledge, but rather, 
knowledge by acquaintance. Thus, when Mary sees red for the first time, she does 
not acquire knowledge of a new fact because she does not learn a new proposition. 
 Tye claims that the best way to understand the distinction between 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is to model it on 
another distinction—the distinction between seeing things and seeing facts. 
Consequently, I will look at what Tye says about the distinction between these two 
types of seeing before moving on to discussing the distinction between types of 
knowing. My hope is that presenting things in this way will give the reader a better 
grasp of Tye’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description.  
2.2. Seeing Things 
Tye claims there is a distinction between seeing things and seeing facts in 
that seeing things cannot be explained in terms of seeing facts. Tye claims we can 
see an object without thereby seeing some fact about it.  
In ordinary English, we use the term ‘see’ both with respect to objects and with 
respect to facts. We talk of seeing tables, chairs, trees, stars, and people, for 
example. We also describe one another as seeing that the table is covered with 
books, that the table is made of wood, that the tree has acorns on it, and so 
on…there is a genuine distinction reflected in our talk here: seeing things is not 
reducible to seeing that things are thus-and-so (Tye, 2009, 95).  
 
 To illustrate this point Tye uses cases of ubiquitous illusion. Suppose a 
subject is standing looking at a red cube before them. Unbeknownst to them, the 
cube is actually white, but illuminated in red light (Tye, 2009, 95). The subject fails 
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to see that the cube is white, but nevertheless sees the cube. He sees the thing—the 
cube—without thereby seeing the fact that it is white. We can complicate the 
example further so that the subject knows none of the object’s properties, but 
nevertheless still sees the object. For example, suppose the same white cube that 
appears red, is actually not in front of the subject but is off to the side of him or 
her, and reflected in a mirror that makes it appear that it is right in front of the 
subject. Suppose further, that it is a funny or distorted mirror such that the cube is 
actually an oblong rectangle, but nevertheless appears like a cube to the subject 
(Tye, 2009, 95). In this situation, the subject misperceives the colour, shape, and 
location of the object. There is no property of the object that the subject can see. 
Nevertheless, the subject still sees the object. It is just that he or she cannot see that 
the cube is white, off to the side of them, and actually not cubical in shape. But the 
object is still seen.  
The general point here is that one can see an object O without there being any 
property P such that one sees that O has P, or without there being any property 
P such that one sees with respect to O that it has P. This is indicated by the cube 
example and other such cases of ubiquitous error (Tye, 2009, 95).  
Thus Tye concludes that,  
To see a thing, it suffices that the thing looks some way to the perceiver; and 
something can look some way without the perceiver’s noticing that it is that way, 
and thus without the perceiver seeing that it is that way (Tye, 2009, 95).  
 
 What Tye is claiming in these passages is that the verb “see” has different 
senses, and these different senses indicate a difference in types of mental states. 
When we say of a certain subject that they see the books, we are ascribing to them 
a mental state or event in which the subject is related to a visual entity such as the 
books. When we say of a certain subject that they see that the books are on the table, 
we are ascribing to them a mental state or event in which they are related to a 
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proposition. Thus, Tye’s claim is that there is, at a minimum, a two types of seeing. 
The first type of seeing is a relation to mind-independent objects. The second type 
of seeing, seeing-that, is a relation to a proposition. According to Tye, this is a 
genuine distinction between types of mental states. 
 This is not just applicable to mental states of ‘seeing’ either. Tye thinks this 
distinction applies to many intentional states:  
In ordinary English, we talk of liking, loving, and fearing things. I like the songs 
of Neil Young, for example. My mother loves me. My great aunt used to fear 
spiders. It is not in the least obvious that in any of these cases the mental state is 
one that relates its subject via the liking, loving, or fearing relation to the content 
of a ‘that’ clause, where the content involves the relevant object or is about that 
object (Tye, 2009, 100).  
Thus, according to Tye, ordinary English importantly highlights this distinction 
between types of mental states. When we use English sentences where the 
grammatical object of the verb denotes a perceptible visible entity like books, we 
are ascribing to the subject a mental state in which they are related to objects. When 
we use ordinary English sentences where the grammatical object of the verb 
denotes a proposition (that is, when the grammatical object of the verb is 
something like a ‘that-clause’), we are ascribing to the subject a mental state in 
which they are related to a proposition. 
 But while Tye calls our attention to two types of senses for “see”, French 
(2013) distinguishes between at least three senses of “see”. To get a better grasp of 
how the semantics of “see” interact with theories of mental states, I will need to 
explain French’s (2013) three types of “see”. This is important as it highlights how 
Tye is thinking of seeing in contrast to seeing-that. 
 According to French (2013), “see” is polysemous, and the different senses of 
“see” have different semantic restrictions. For instance, we have sentences of the 
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form ‘John sees the book’, where the verb “see” has as its grammatical object a 
term that denotes a particular visual entity (French, 2013, 1741). But we also have 
sentences of the form ‘John sees that the books are on the table’ where the object 
of the verb is a ‘that-clause’ which denotes a proposition (or a similar entity) 
(French, 2013, 1742).  
 We can differentiate these forms of sentences by differentiating between the 
types of arguments the verb can take (French 2013). In the former, we have 
sentences where the verb takes a grammatical object that denotes a particular 
visible entity such as the book or the tree. Following French (2013), we can call 
such types of seeing object seeing, where the object is not restricted to a material 
object, but includes, for instance, events as in ‘I saw the coronation’ and quantities 
as in ‘I saw six swimmers’. On this sense of “see” then,  see means something like 
perceive visually. This case of object seeing French calls the ‘basic perceptual case’.  
By contrast, sentences of the form seeing-that where the grammatical object 
of the verb is a ‘that-clause’, “see” does not (necessarily) mean perceive visually 
because propositions are not visible entities. For instance, one has sentences of the 
form ‘I see that Jane’s argument is valid’, where the semantics of ‘see’ does not 
entail that what is denoted by the grammatical object is anything like a visually 
perceptible object. Of course, I might see that Jane’s argument is valid by looking at 
it on the blackboard, but importantly I need not. For one can “see” Jane’s argument 
is valid even if one is blind (French 2013). On the second sense of “see” then, see 
means something like ‘understand’ or ‘grasp’. Thus, French (2013) calls this second 
sense the “purely epistemic” sense.  
Furthermore, French argues, the pure epistemic sense is factive and 
cognitive.  
In these examples ‘see’ is like ‘believes’ or ‘thinks’ on propositional readings of 
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those verbs: it ascribes a propositional attitude. But in these constructions ‘see’ 
doesn’t just mean believes or thinks, since it picks out a factive attitude—believing 
that p, and thinking that p aren’t factive attitudes, since a factive attitude is an 
attitude one can have only to truths, and one can believe, or think, that p when p 
is not true…[thus] paraphrase data reveals that there is more to the meaning of 
‘see’ in these constructions than merely believes and thinks. Rather, ‘see’ in these 
constructions is closely connected in meaning to the meaning of ‘know’ on its 
propositional reading (French, 2013, 1742). 
 
The purely epistemic sense picks out a factive attitude. This will have important 
consequences for Tye’s views on seeing-that, as I will argue below. Before that 
though, I will spell out the third and final sense of “see” in French (2013).  
 A third sense for “see” that French points out is what he calls the “epistemic 
perceptual sense”. It is a subtle distinction and may even be categorized as a 
hybrid of the two. Consider, for example, the following the sentence: ‘by the 
position of the sun, I see that the day is almost over’ (adapted from French 2013). 
The sense of “see” in this sentence shares features with both of the two senses 
discussed above. On the one hand, it ascribes the subject a visual perception—that 
is, the subject is in the state of visually seeing the sun. On the other hand, it also 
ascribes to the subject a factive propositional attitude—that is, that the day is 
almost over. 
How best to explain the epistemic perceptual sense is a matter of debate 
(French 2013). One view would be to claim that the subject is in a perceptual state 
with propositional content. Another, would be to claim that the subject is in an 
epistemic state with propositional content. But that this epistemic state is based on a 
perceptual state, which need not be propositional itself. This latter view leaves 
open the nature of the perceptual state itself. The importance of this is that there is 
a way to explain seeing-that without ascribing propositional content to the 
perceptual state itself. Thus, in cases of seeing-that, how we are related to the 
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proposition is a matter of debate. It is not necessarily by being in a perceptual state 
with propositional content. 
 This is important for our discussion of Tye because Tye thinks we can have 
non-propositional perceptual states. Indeed, according to Tye, all that is required 
to see an object is that it enables the subject to wonder “what is that?” (2009, 20). 
He calls this requirement that of being epistemically enabling. In order for a subject 
to count as seeing some object, they must be able to have the thought ‘what is that?’ 
about the object. Cases of failure of an experience to be epistemically enabling will 
help elucidate this requirement. Suppose you are hiking in the woods and on a 
tree in front of you there is a brown camouflaged moth. You are looking right at 
the moth but do not see it. In such a case, your experience does not enable you to 
ask ‘what is that?’ with respect to the moth because you cannot see it.  
What matters is whether my experience directly (that is, non-inferentially ) 
enables me to query what that is, where that is the moth. Since my experience 
does not enable me to do this the moth is hidden from me. I am blind to its 
presence. I am not conscious of it (Tye, 2009, 13).  
 
On Tye’s view then, what counts as seeing is very minimal, for all that is required 
is your experience must be epistemically enabling with respect to the object. This 
does not require that you are in a state of seeing-that with respect to the object. It 
merely requires your experience to be epistemically enabling.  This lends support 
to the idea that Tye conceives of states of seeing-that not as ones where the subject 
has a perceptual state with propositional content, but where the subject is in an 
epistemic state that is propositional based on the perceptual state. Thus, according 
to Tye, even in cases seeing that, there is an element of seeing that is non-
propositional, namely at the level of perceptual content.  
This analysis helps us to better grasp the cube example that Tye gives, 
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which I presented earlier. Importantly, it helps us to see that Tye thinks seeing-that 
are factive mental states. Recall that Tye claims that something can look some way 
without the subject seeing-that it is that way. The cube looks red but isn’t red. Rather, 
on Tye’s view, to see that an object O has some property P, the object must actually 
have the property P. This means that in order for a subject to be in the mental state 
of seeing-that, the state must be factive. For instance, in the case where the white 
cube appears red, Tye claims that (i) the cube looks red to the subject even though 
it is not, but (ii) the subject cannot see-that it is red: “Paul cannot see that the cube 
is red, for the cube is white” (Tye, 2009, 95). And Tye generalizes this point to say 
that of any object O the subject need not be in a mental state of seeing-that with 
respect to any of the objects properties. This indicates that Tye thinks that one 
cannot be in a state of seeing-that with respect to something that is not the case. So 
the subject cannot see-that about anything of the object. Thus, the subject is not in 
a mental state of seeing-that with respect to that object. Thus, he takes seeing-that 
to be a factive mental state.  
This is important because it highlights that Tye thinks we can be in factive 
mental states with propositional content where the propositional content is not 
part of the perceptual experience. This will become important when we discuss 
Tye’s theory of knowledge of things, a type of knowledge he claims is non-
propositional, non-conceptual and can only be acquired through experience.  
2.3 Knowledge of Things  
According to Tye, the distinction between seeing and seeing-that is 
analogous to the distinction between knowing things and knowing facts. 
Knowledge of a thing stands to certain kinds of factual knowledge in 
something like the relationship in which seeing a thing stands to certain 
kinds of seeing-that (Tye, 2009, 101). 
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For the purposes of providing a physicalist response to the knowledge argument, 
the most important difference between knowledge of things and knowledge of 
facts is that knowledge of things is a form of awareness that is non-propositional. To 
say what counts as non-propositional, we need to say what counts as 
propositional. Though philosophers disagree over what propositions are and what 
functions they serve, there is a somewhat standard way of understanding them 
that we can adopt for our purposes. On this standard reading, propositions are 
primarily the bearers of truth values. That is to say, propositions are the sorts of 
things that can be true or false. For instance, the proposition “David Cameron is 
the Prime Minister of the U.K.” is true just in case David Cameron is the Prime 
Minister of the U.K. The proposition “Barack Obama is the Prime Minister of the 
U.K.” is false just in case Obama is not the Prime Minister.  
On the standard reading, true propositions can be seen to represent facts 
rather than things. For instance, the proposition “David Cameron is the Prime 
Minister of the U.K.” represents the fact that Cameron is the Prime Minister of the 
U.K. The proposition is a true proposition just in case it represents a fact. Since 
true propositions represent facts, coming to know true propositions is one way to 
come to know certain facts.  
However, it is important to note that propositions do not represent things. 
The noun-phrase “Prime Minister” may figure in a sentence that expresses a 
proposition, but by itself it is not a proposition. This is because the Prime Minister 
is not a fact but rather a thing, in particular, an individual person. Thus, true 
propositions represent facts, not things. Consequently, we can distinguish 
between knowledge of facts as propositional and knowledge of things as non-
propositional.  
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Knowledge of things is a form of knowledge that is non-propositional. This 
means that you can know a thing without knowing some proposition about it. 
Moreover, even if you know many or all the propositions about some thing, that 
still does not mean you have thing-knowledge of that thing. Common discourse 
seems to highlight this distinction. For example, you may not know any facts about 
the Prime Minister, such as how long he or she has been in office, or which political 
party they are a member. You may not even know that the United Kingdom is 
governed by a Prime Minister. Nevertheless, if you met the current Prime Minister, 
then it would be said that you know or are acquainted with the Prime Minister. 
Even if you didn’t know he is the Prime Minister, you still know him. Thus, you 
can know some thing without knowing some fact about that thing (or in this case, 
that person). That is, it is not a necessary condition on knowing a thing that you 
know some fact about it.  
Likewise, you may know all the facts about the Prime Minister, and you 
may be capable of expressing all these facts in the form of sentences that express 
true propositions. Nevertheless, if you have never met the Prime Minister, then 
there is a certain sense in which you do not know the Prime Minister. You may 
know all about him, but you still do not know him. Knowing him requires meeting 
him. Thus, no matter how many facts you know about something, knowing facts 
is not sufficient to have thing-knowledge of that thing. 
From these observations we can infer that knowing facts or propositions is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing a thing. Thus, thing-knowledge is not 
reducible to propositional knowledge. Of course, in actual cases of knowing some 
thing, you often come to know propositional knowledge too. For instance, in 
meeting the Prime Minister you might come to know that he is tall or that he has 
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dark hair. But knowing him does not consist in knowing these facts about him. 
Knowing things is a distinct form of knowledge that is essentially non-
propositional.  
Just like you can see some object without thereby seeing-that the object is 
such and such, so too you can know some object without thereby knowing-that 
the object is such and such. There are types of seeing and knowing that are non-
propositional. Moreover, these non-propositional types of seeing and knowing are 
not reducible to types of seeing or knowing that are propositional. And, since 
seeing facts and knowing facts requires states of seeing with propositional content 
and states of knowledge with propositional content, respectively, there are types 
of seeing and knowing that are not seeing facts or knowing facts. These are the 
essential features of the analogy between seeing and knowing that Tye draws our 
attention too. As we shall see, they are the essential ingredients in Tye’s 
acquaintance response to the knowledge argument.  
2.4 The Nature of Acquaintance  
 As I said before, Tye’s view of acquaintance is informed by Russell’s view, 
but Tye explicitly rejects much of what Russell took to be distinctive of 
acquaintance. In this section, I will compare and contrast Russell's and Tye’s 
understanding of acquaintance. This is not only of historical interest. Many salient 
features of Russell’s theory are still endorsed by contemporary acquaintance 
theorists (Fumerton, Richard and Ali Hasan, 2014). Consequently, observing how 
Tye differs from Russell is one way to highlight Tye’s idiosyncratic views on 
acquaintance. Moreover, many parts of Tye’s theory of acquaintance are 
variations, some large and some small, on Russell’s initial notion. Thus, we can’t 
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really understand Tye’s theory of acquaintance without at least some knowledge 
of Russell’s theory of acquaintance.  
 As Russell originally conceived of acquaintance, it was a relation that held 
between a conscious subject and some object (Russell, 1910-11). This relation is 
often said to be primitive and direct (Fumerton, Richard and Ali Hasan, 2014). For 
Tye, on the other hand, acquaintance is not a relation but a representation that has 
the object as its constituent. To be acquainted with an object O is for O to be a 
constituent of the representational content. This is one of the more significant 
differences between Tye’s theory and other philosophers who embrace some 
notion of acquaintance. We will spend the next two chapters dealing with this 
aspect of Tye’s view. For now, we will have to be content with just flagging it. 
On Russell’s theory, the acquaintance relation is often thought to be 
primitive because it cannot be explained in terms of anything else (Fumerton, 
Richard and Ali Hasan, 2014). But whether Tye endorses the idea that 
acquaintance is primitive is not clear. He is certainly not explicit about it, and I 
believe there is evidence both ways. On the one hand, Tye says knowledge by 
acquaintance cannot be reduced to any other form of knowledge. This seems to 
indicate that knowledge by acquaintance cannot be explained in terms of any other 
form of knowledge and therefore is a primitive form of knowledge. On the other 
hand, Tye argues that Russell’s theory can only be made sense of if we have a 
correct theory of perceptual content. This seems to suggest that acquaintance can 
be explained in more basic terms, namely in terms of representational content. 
Much turns on whether or not Tye can make good on his promise to elucidate 
knowledge by acquaintance in terms of representational content, and the next two 
chapters are devoted to that discussion. However, I think nothing too significant 
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seems to turn on whether or not acquaintance is primitive, at least with respect to 
Tye’s theory of acquaintance as a response to the knowledge argument. 
Directness can be understood in different ways. I will explain these 
different ways and then say how Russell and Tye are thinking about them.  
One way to understand directness is in terms of the distinction between 
inferential and non-inferential knowledge. In this sense, to know directly some 
item P is to know it without knowing any other item Q first from which you infer 
P. The most salient cases of non-inferential knowledge are those involving 
perceptual states. You look at a table and are directly aware that it is brown. You 
do not need to infer that it is brown from some other truths you know about it, nor 
do you need to know anything else about the table. Simply by looking, you see the 
table is brown. You are directly aware of it. By contrast, inferential knowledge 
requires you to infer from other things you know. For example, I could know that 
Jane is on campus today because I see her car in the parking lot on campus and 
because she told me she would be driving her car to school today. From these two 
pieces of information, (i) seeing Jane’s car in the parking lot and (ii) being told that 
Jane will be driving to campus in her car today, I can infer that (iii) Jane is at school. 
I have inferential knowledge that Jane is at school today. Of course, I could know 
Jane is at school today non-inferentially by seeing her on campus. 
Another way to spell out the criteria of directness for acquaintance is the 
distinction between direct/indirect perception. This is often associated with sense-
data theories of perception, whereby you are indirectly aware of a material object 
by being directly aware of a sense-data caused by that material object. There is 
evidence that Russell may have thought of the acquaintance relation as direct in 
this way. Consequently, one way to read Russell is as using the distinction 
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between direct and indirect perception as a way to defend the view that 
acquaintance is non-inferential precisely because it is a form of indirect perception. 
Whether that view is defensible will take us too far afield. By contrast, Tye claims 
that even if the distinction between direct/indirect perception can be made sense of 
outside the sense-data theory of perception (and he seems sceptical it can) it 
nevertheless seems possible that ‘indirect perception’ can still be non-inferent ial 
in certain cases. He argues that if I think I can only be aware of the table by being 
aware of one of its facing surfaces, then this might be a form of ‘indirect 
perception’. Nevertheless, that does not require that this form of indirect 
perception requires one to be aware of the table only by inference. (Tye, 2009, 103). 
Tye is sceptical that directness is required for acquaintance because he 
thinks that there can be indirect non-inferential knowledge. For instance, Tye 
points out that Russell thought we do not know objects directly but only indirectly 
by being aware of their facing surface. Tye claims that Russell assumed “indirect 
awareness involves inference” (2009, 98). Tye thinks this is wrong because we can 
know non-inferentially about material objects, regardless whether or not it is right 
to say we can only know them indirectly by being aware of their facing surfaces. 
Thus, for Tye, the distinction between indirect and direct knowledge is not 
essential because both can be non-inferential (Tye, 2009, 98).  
In sum, Tye departs somewhat from the traditional way of understanding 
acquaintance. He does not claim it is primitive relation. He also understands the 
“directness” of acquaintance somewhat differently than Russell, namely as non-
inferential. Thus, what is central to Tye’s theory of acquaintance is that 
acquaintance should be non-inferential. 
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2.5 The Objects of Acquaintance 
 We have said that acquaintance holds between a conscious subject and an 
object. It requires a conscious subject in the sense that there cannot be acquaintance 
between two non-conscious objects. A chair cannot be acquainted with another 
chair, for instance, because both chairs are non-conscious objects and thus there is 
no conscious subject as one of the acquaintance relation’s relata (or if acquaintance 
is not thought of as a relation, because it requires a conscious subject to represent 
some object). So far, this seems non-controversial. But what about the objects to 
which the conscious subject is related/represents? Are there restrictions on the 
types of things to which the subject can be acquainted?  
 On most theories of acquaintance, the object can be a variety of different 
types of things. Russell, for instance, held that a conscious subject can be 
acquainted with particulars, universals, abstract logical facts, relations, and the self 
(1910-11, 1912, 1992)5. Unlike Russell however, Michael Tye is not very explicit as 
to what types of objects can fill the object role. Nevertheless, I believe there is 
evidence he takes both particulars and universals to be the objects of acquaintance. 
The type of objects Tye thinks we can be acquainted with is important because 
different types of objects interact differently with Tye’s theory of perceptual 
content, which we spell out in the next chapter. This interaction effects how 
acquaintance obtains, which in turns effects how Mary becomes acquainted with 
red.  
                                                 
5  Russell changed his mind on what types of objects could fill the place of the object in the 
relation. For instance, in Russell (1912) he argues subjects can be acquainted with the self, but 
in the third chapter of Russell (1992) he explicitly rejects this.  
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That Tye thinks the acquaintance relation can hold between a conscious 
subject and a particular is obvious throughout the text. For instance, he argues we 
can be acquainted both with garden variety concrete physical objects like tables 
and chairs (2009, 98), and also with less corporeal things like events (2009, 135). 
With regards to universals the matter is less obvious, but I think a case can be made 
for the fact that Tye is committed to the claim that subjects can be acquainted with 
universals. My reason for this is that Tye explicitly claims that we can be 
acquainted with un-instantiated properties (2009, 82). For instance, Tye argues that 
when we see colours we are acquainted with the phenomenal character of that 
colour. So when Mary first leaves her room she is acquainted with the phenomenal 
character of redness. Furthermore, Tye claims that the phenomenal character is a 
thing, but not a concrete thing; it is a complex property of material objects, and it 
is public in the sense that you can know it just as much as I can know it (2009, 117). 
Moreover, he thinks that un-instantiated properties like redness can be known in 
cases of hallucination (2009, 82). So, if knowing colours requires acquaintance with 
colours, and if we can know colours in hallucination, then we must be acquainted 
with colours in hallucination. Since un-instantiated properties are not particulars, 
but universals, then we must be able to be acquainted with universals. Thus, I 
conclude that Tye thinks we are acquainted not only with particulars but with 
universals, and he takes colours to be universals.  
Tye does not present any evidence that we are acquainted with relations. 
Indeed, I think there is some evidence against such a view. He does not think, for 
instance, that we can be acquainted with facts. If we take facts to be complexes in 
the world, then facts necessarily contain relations. The fact ‘the books are on the 
table’, for instance, is made up of the objects the table, and the books, as well as the 
relation on top of. This evidence is not conclusive that Tye thinks we cannot be 
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acquainted with relations, but the text is devoid of any indication where he seems 
to suggest we are acquainted with relations. I point this out only for the sake of 
completion and do not think it affects my argument. For the purposes of the 
knowledge argument, the important factors are that (1) we can be acquainted with 
(different kinds of) particulars and also with universals, especially properties, and 
(2) we cannot be acquainted with facts. Whether we can be acquainted with other 
types of relations is not clear, but nor is it pressing. 
2.6 Experience Needed 
 In order to be acquainted with a thing, Tye claims that the thing known 
must be experienced. Knowledge by acquaintance requires that one must have a 
conscious experience of that thing. As Tye says, “where I have not encountered a 
thing in experience…I am not acquainted with it in the relevant sense” (2009, 101). 
Moreover, not any experience will count. For instance, if the lighting is extremely 
poor or there are distorting barriers like thick glass, then the experience may be 
insufficient for acquaintance. 
Genuine acquaintance in the visual case requires an encounter in 
experience of a sort that allows for a good look at the thing. Corresponding 
requirements seem appropriate for non-visual cases of acquaintance (Tye, 
2009, 101).  
What counts as a “good look” at a thing may vary from context to context. What 
is central is that the subject be able to place the thing in the subject role of a thought, 
such as wondering ‘what is that?’, even if they do not actually do this. This is 
important because it means that the objects Tye thinks we can be acquainted with 
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must be capable of playing the subject role in a subject-predicate proposition.6 In 
order to wonder ‘what is that?’, that has to be capable of being the subject of the 
thought. This is important because it effects how and when the acquaintance 
relation obtains/representation occurs, and with respect to what types of objects. 
For instance, Tye thinks we can be acquainted with properties. This means that 
properties can play the subject role in a subject-predicate structured proposition. 
For instance, red can be predicated of objects in propositions such as “that 
strawberry is red”, but it can also figure into the subject role in propositions such 
as “that red is brighter than that blue” when looking, say, at a particular 
strawberry and a particular blueberry. Moreover, the propositional content of an 
experience might be capable of being analysed into different propositions. For 
instance, in an experience of seeing red strawberries one might form the thought, 
“those strawberries are very red”, or one might form the thought “the red of those 
strawberries is brighter than the blue of those blueberries”. In the first expression, 
“strawberries” is the subject and “red” is the predicate which is predicated of the 
object. In the second expression, “red” is the subject and “bright” is the predicate, 
signalling that the property of brightness is being predicated of the object red. Thus 
an experience may give rise to different analyses with different propositional 
content. I think that, on Tye’s view, which analysis is actually taken does not matter 
so much as which analyses are possible to be taken. If an item is such that it cannot 
play the subject role in a structured proposition, then a subject cannot be 
acquainted with it. I am not arguing that, on Tye’s view, in order to be acquainted 
                                                 
6  We will later see why this is important when we discuss Tye’s theory of perceptual content, as 
he thinks perception yields a singular proposition. What thing is capable of being the object in 
that proposition will matter to determining what thing we can be acquainted with.  
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with a thing you must put it in the subject part of a proposition. But I am arguing 
that Tye’s criteria of epistemic enabling requires that you be capable of it. 
 Why should we think such a minimal requirement of experience provides 
you knowledge of things? The main reason, for Tye, that conscious experience 
gives you knowledge of things is that it is incoherent to claim that you are 
genuinely conscious of something and yet do not know it at all (2009, 98). 
Intuitively, just by experiencing redness, you thereby know redness.  
To see a thing, it suffices that the thing look some way to the perceiver; 
and something can look some way without the perceiver’s noticing that it 
is that way and thus without the perceiver seeing that it is that way (Tye, 
2009, 95).  
I can see a computer by looking at it, but I need not see that it is a computer. Perhaps 
I lack the concept computer and so cannot see the computer as a computer. 
Nevertheless, I still see the computer. The upshot of this is that it respects the 
intuitive idea that creatures without our conceptual capacities are capable of 
seeing things we see. A baby or animal can surely see a computer without seeing 
it as a computer, for they lack the concept computer. 
Tye’s claim about seeing is stronger than this though, for it is not just that 
perceivers who do not share our conceptual capacities can see the objects we see. 
Rather, it is that, even if we have the requisite concepts, we nevertheless can see 
the object without deploying that concept at all. Thus I can see a thing without 
seeing that it is a certain way, even if I am capable of such seeing. This point does 
not just apply to objects, but to the properties of objects as well. For instance, I can 
see an instance of redness without thereby seeing that it is red. This may be because 
I am a creature who lacks the concept redness, or it may be because even though I 
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do have the concept redness, I do not deploy that concept. I do not see that it is red. 
Nevertheless, I still see red. 
2.7 Solving the Puzzle  
 It is now time to apply Tye’s views about knowledge and perception that 
we have been discussing in this chapter to the Mary case. As stated earlier, Tye 
thinks there is an implicit assumption in the knowledge argument: coming to 
know something new requires discovering a new fact.  
Mary in her room knows all the physical facts about the subjective 
character of the experience of red. But there is a perfectly ordinary sense 
of ‘know’ under which she does not know the thing that is the subjective 
character of the experience of red. She is not acquainted with that thing. 
When she leaves the room and becomes acquainted with the phenomenal 
or subjective character of the experience of red, thereby she knows it. This 
is genuinely new knowledge, logically distinct from her earlier factual 
knowledge (Tye, 2009, 131-132).  
What Mary comes to know when she sees red for the first time is the phenomenal 
character of redness. On Tye’s view, phenomenal character is a property of objects 
in the world, not of experiences. It is a property of strawberries, fire engines, and 
other red things. The phenomenal character of an experience is a property of 
material objects that are independent of human minds. The phenomenal character 
of redness, on Tye’s view, exists even if someone does not actually experience it. 
What Mary learns is the phenomenal character of redness. She learns this by being 
acquainted with redness. This knowledge is non-propositional. It is not 
knowledge of the fact that this is red. It is knowledge of the property red. This is 
not some old fact she comes to know in a new way. She did not know the 
phenomenal character of redness before she saw redness. Moreover, she could not 
know the phenomenal character of redness until she saw redness. Seeing redness 
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makes her acquainted with the phenomenal character of redness and gives her 
knowledge of this thing. 
Some might object that this knowledge is knowledge of what an experience 
is like and therefore something Mary could have known simply by looking at brain 
scans through a “cerebroscope” in her black-and-white room. The “cerebroscope”  
is a fictional instrument, somewhat like a microscope, that allows Mary to look 
within the skulls of test subjects and observe their brain functions. The objection 
is that “Mary in her room can know the experience of red itself, since she can be 
acquainted with the physical state that is the experience of red in other people via 
the cerebroscope” (Tye, 2009, 135). In other words, if Mary can see the brain 
function of a subject when that subject is looking at a red object, then she will see 
the brain function that occurs when a subject sees red, and since experiences are 
realized in the brain, she will be looking directly at the experience of red as it 
happens in the brain. By looking at the brain function, she is acquainted with the 
experience of red. Thus, she is acquainted with the brain state redness and thus 
with the experience, since colour experiences are brain states.  
According to Tye, this objection fails because it is not possible for Mary, 
even with her cerebroscope, to be non-inferentially conscious of a brain state that 
realizes colour experiences. Acquaintance, remember, is a non-inferential mode of 
awareness of things and their properties. By seeing a physical brain state that 
registers redness she is not non-inferentially aware of redness. She can be aware of 
a token brain state. But she cannot be aware of the ‘neurological type that the token 
instantiates’. Accordingly, Tye notes, 
The point I want to emphasize is that when Mary sees something red for 
the first time, she comes to be acquainted with red, and thus with the 
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phenomenal character of the experience of red. She does not come to be 
acquainted with the experience of red. Thus, what she knows when she sees 
something red is not a brain state, even if the experience of red is a brain 
state. So there is no threat here to my claim that, on my proposal, in seeing 
red things Mary genuinely makes a significant discovery (Tye, 2009, 135). 
Thus, Tye rejects the objection. Mary is not acquainted with red by seeing a 
brain state. Consequently, Mary cannot be acquainted with red until she 
actually sees red herself. So the acquaintance hypothesis is not undermined 
by the cerebroscope objection. 
2.8 The Variant 
 There is a variant of the Mary case that Michael Tye discusses as a possible 
objection to his view, but then summarily dismisses the objection. It is important 
for us to look at this variant case because it presents a deeper understanding of 
Tye’s view. 
Tye proposes that if what Mary learns is knowledge of the phenomenal 
character of redness, and if phenomenal character is taken to be what it is like to 
undergo an experience, then the following variant seems potentially problematic: 
Suppose Mary is still in her black and white room and still has not seen any 
colours. One day, while she's still in her room, we decide to show her a patch of 
red, but we don’t tell her it is red, nor do we show her any object that is canonically 
red, such as a tomato or strawberries. We do this because if she knew strawberries 
were red, this would not help her because the red patch is being shown completely 
independently of any object that she knows to be red. Again, we do not tell her 
this is red either. Now she has experienced red, and therefore, she has experienced 
something new in the world. The next day, we let her outside and she sees some 
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strawberries and tomatoes sitting on a kitchen table. In such a situation as this, it 
seems plausible to say that Mary learns what redness is like. For instance, we could 
imagine her thinking to herself ‘aha! so this is what redness is like. That patch they 
showed me yesterday was red. This is what the experience of red must be like’. 
This variant of the Mary case might seem to cause problems for Tye’s theory 
because since the phenomenal character of experiencing red just is redness, then 
she knew what redness was like in her black-and-white room the day before. But 
it seems plausible to say she did learn something new when we let her out in this 
case. Tye calls this new version of Mary “Experienced Mary” because she has 
experienced redness in her black-and-white room. So, given Tye’s theory, what 
could she have possibly learned when she leaves her black-and-white room? 
According to Tye, upon leaving her room: 
She comes to know what it is like to experience red. In her room, she does 
not know what it is like to experience red, since her factual knowledge 
that this is what it is like to experience red is not based on her knowledge 
by acquaintance of the phenomenal character…Once ‘Experienced Mary’ 
steps outside and makes the connection between the phenomenal 
character of her experience and the colour red, she knows what it is like to 
experience red. Thereby she learns something new (2009, 134).  
In her black-and-white room, she has knowledge by acquaintance of the 
phenomenal character of redness. This is knowledge by acquaintance is “thing-
knowledge”. In contrast, what it is like to experience some property is factual 
knowledge. It involves bringing the phenomenal character of an experience under 
a concept and coming to know that this is what it is like to have such an experience. 
But in her black-and-white room, Mary knows no facts about this object because 
she does not know it is the colour red, even though she is acquainted with it. That 
is, she doesn’t know what it is like to experience red because she knows no facts 
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about red until she steps out of her room and sees red objects, such as the 
strawberries and tomatoes, and brings those red objects under the concept red. So 
she knows the phenomenal character of red, but doesn't know the fact that this is 
the phenomenal character of red until she steps outside and can link her “thing-
knowledge” with factual knowledge. 
Ultimately, Tye rejects the knowledge argument against physicalism 
because Jackson equivocates between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge 
of facts. According to Tye, there is knowledge of things and knowledge of facts. 
Knowledge of things, also known as knowledge by acquaintance, is not reducible 
to knowledge of facts. Knowledge by acquaintance requires experience. Before her 
release, Mary knows all the facts about redness, but she has never experienced red. 
Since she has never experienced red she lacks knowledge by acquaintance of red. 
What she acquires when she sees red for the first time is knowledge by 
acquaintance of red. Red is a property of mind-independent physical objects like 
tomatoes and strawberries. By being acquainted with this property in her 
experience she comes to have new knowledge about the world, namely knowledge 
by acquaintance of that property. So Mary does acquire new knowledge of a 
physical property, and that new knowledge is no threat to physicalism. Thus, Tye 
rejects Jackson’s view because Tye thinks there are two types of knowledge and 
Jackson’s view doesn't account for these two types of knowledge.  
One way that Tye’s account respects Jackson’s view is that he accepts the 
new knowledge Mary acquires is knowledge of a new property. The difference is 
that for Jackson, this property is a non-physical mental property, a quale, that 
could only be known by being in a mental state that has that property, and thus, 
for Jackson, Mary learned a new fact by having a new property. By contrast, for 
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Tye, this property is a physical property of mind-independent objects and Mary 
acquires new knowledge of this property by being acquainted with it. Thus, in 
Tye’s view, Mary’s new knowledge is not factual knowledge because it is not 
propositional knowledge.  
As I said earlier in this chapter, Tye departs from other acquaintance 
theorists by conceiving of acquaintance as a representation instead of a relation. If 
Tye’s acquaintance response to the knowledge argument is going to hold water, 
we must examine how such a theory of representational content fleshes out the 




Chapter 3: The Need for Perceptual Contact  
3.1 Introduction 
 As we saw in the last chapter, Michael Tye claims that to be acquainted with 
something one must experience it. This invites inquiry into Tye’s views on 
perceptual experience. In particular, we may ask, are his commitments about 
perceptual experience compatible with the acquaintance hypothesis? In this 
chapter, we will attempt to answer this question by spelling out in detail Tye’s 
commitments with respect to perceptual experience. Our focus will be on two 
aspects, his theory of perceptual content, and his views on phenomenal character. 
After laying out each of these aspects, I will raise some challenges to the viability 
of combining these aspects with Tye’s theory of acquaintance that we spelled out 
in the last chapter. I will suggest that it is not obvious that Tye’s views on 
perception are compatible with his acquaintance hypothesis. In the chapter four, I 
will suggest an alternative and argue that the motivations Tye cites for adopting 
the positions he does are actually motivations for embracing a relationist 
alternative. Before that though, we need to set out Tye’s main views of perception 
and also the motivations he cites for those views.  
3.2 The Content of Experience  
 Michael Tye develops a theory of perceptual content called the Singular 
When Filled thesis (hereon SWF). According to Tye, all perceptual experiences 
have a representational content. That means that all experiences represent the 
world as being some way. A veridical experience, for instance, is veridical just in 
case the world is the way experience represents it to be.  
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The SWF thesis includes the further claim that the objects are literally 
constituents of the content, at least in case of veridical and illusory experience. The 
content does not merely represent that, for instance, there is a glass of milk on the 
desk in front of me, but that that particular glass of milk is on my desk. In cases of 
veridical experience (and in cases of illusory experience), the actual singular 
object—that is, the particular glass of milk— is a constituent of the content.  
Tye contrasts this with forms of representational theories of perceptual 
content such as Martin Davies theory (Tye, 2009, 81). On views such as Davies, the 
content is not singular, but existentially quantified (Davies 1992). That is, the 
experience represents a state of affairs that does not make reference to the 
particular objects. Rather, it represents the world as containing some object with 
such and such properties. For instance, according to philosophers like Davies who 
think the content of experience is existentially quantified, an experience of a glass 
of milk on my desk represents that there is a glass of milk on my desk. It does not 
refer to that particular glass of milk that is on my desk.  
Tye claims that this existential approach to representational content will not 
work because it does not account for what he calls the particularity of our 
experience. By this he means that the contents of experience contain particular 
objects. He makes prominent use of cases of perceptual illusion to highlight this 
point. Recall the case of the illusory cube that we discussed in the last chapter. In 
that case, it looks to you as if there is a red cube in front of you. Unbeknownst to 
you, there is a mirror right in front of you that is reflecting the cube, so the cube is 
actually behind and to the right of you. Furthermore, the cube is actually white 
but there is a red light behind you being shone on the cube, making it appear red. 
The result is that you misperceive what is actually a white cube located behind 
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you for a red cube located in front of you. On the existential thesis, according to 
Tye, this situation is accounted for by the fact that the content of your experience 
is inaccurate because it represents a red cube in front of you, and there is really no 
such situation. However, Tye points out, this leaves out a crucial point about this 
situation. It is not just that your experience represents the world inaccurately, it is 
that it misrepresents that cube. The reason your experience is inaccurate, Tye 
argues, is not because it misrepresents some state of affairs, although that is true 
too. Rather, it is because it misrepresents a particular object in the world. It 
misrepresents that particular cube’s location and colour. Let us call this the 
particularity of experience. By that I mean that experience has particularity to it in 
that it represents particular objects in the world, not just general states of affairs. 
Tye thinks that the existential thesis of representationalism cannot account for this 
particularity, no matter how sophisticated you make the existential content (2009, 
80). Tye argues that the only way to account for the particularity of experience is 
to allow that particular objects literally enter into the contents of the experience.  
Tye’s SWF theory aims to redress this shortcoming of the existential thesis. 
It does so by having veridical perceptions result in a singular proposition which 
has a particular object as its constituent. As Tye puts it,  
Visual experiences have a singular content or at least putatively singular 
content. They simply do not present the world to us in the way that the 
existential thesis requires. There is a particularity in our experience which 
the existential thesis fails to capture fully (94). 
 What does it mean then, to say that the content of perception is singular 
when filled? It means that the perceptual content of an experience is a singular 
proposition only when a particular object enters into, and thereby fills the slot in 
the content of the experience. Under Tye’s SWF thesis, a particular object enters 
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into the content both in cases of veridical and illusory experience. For instance, in 
the case of the misperceived cube, the content of that experience was illusory 
because it falsely represented that cube as being red and in front of you. 
Nevertheless, that particular object—the cube— entered into the content of that 
experience, even though the properties ascribed to it were incorrect.  
 On the SWF thesis, hallucinatory experiences are different than veridical 
and illusory experiences in that hallucinatory experiences do not have singular 
content. Consider the following case given by Tye: imagine you are reading a book 
in the garden and you see a particular china frog. You think to yourself, ‘that china 
frog is very ugly’, and then look back at your book and continue reading. A few 
moments later, you look up again, see the china frog, and again think to yourself 
‘that china frog is very ugly’. Unbeknownst to you however, a demon has played 
a trick on you. The demon has removed the china frog from the garden, and yet 
affected your nervous system such that it still looks like there is that same china 
frog to you. How can perceptual experience have singular contents if in one case 
there is an object and in another there is no object but there seems to be? Tye says 
that the second content, where there is no object, is “gappy”.  
The content [of the second experience] is just like the first except that 
where the first has a concrete object in it, the second has a gap. The two 
contents, thus, have a common structure. This structure may be conceived 
of as having a slot in it for an object. In the case of the first content, the slot 
is filled by the china frog. In the case of the second content, the slot is 
empty. I shall call such structures content schemas (Tye, 2009, 81). 
Tye’s content schemas are structurally identical to Russell’s propositional 
functions. Russell first introduced the term ‘propositional function’ in something 
like its contemporary sense (Mares 2014). According to Russell, a propositional 
function is “an expression whose containing one or more undetermined 
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constituents, such that, when values are assigned to these constituents, the 
expression becomes a proposition” (1919a, 156). This is to say that when a 
propositional function takes an object a proposition results, but until such an 
argument is given for the undetermined constituent it is neither true nor false. It 
is only once an object is given that a proposition results and it becomes evaluable 
as true or false. Examples of propositional functions are expressions like ‘x is a 
human’. The expression is not truth-evaluable until some object replaces the 
variable. If we replaced x with ‘Socrates’, then the proposition ‘Socrates is a 
human’ would result.  
Thus, as Russell says, “a propositional function standing all alone may be 
taken to be a mere schema, a mere shell, an empty receptacle for meaning, not 
something already significant” (1919a, 157). Tye’s content schemas provide for a 
gap, that is an empty slot. Thus, we can see that Russell’s notion of propositional 
function is formally identical to Tye’s content schemas.  
In perceptual experiences then, according to Tye, the content schemas are 
shared across cases of veridical, illusory and hallucinatory experiences. That is, the 
contents of these experiences share a structure, though they differ in what their 
contents are. When an object fills the gap, a singular proposition results. When it 
doesn't, as in the case of hallucination, a singular proposition does not result:  
One natural way to conceive of the relevant SWF schemas is on the model 
of Russellian singular propositions having slots in place of objects. When 
the slot is filled by a seen object, a Russellian singular proposition results 
(Tye, 2009, 82).  
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 Hence the name Singular When Filled thesis of perceptual content 7 . 
Although they share a content structure, cases of veridical and hallucinatory 
experiences do not have the same content. One has particular objects as part of it, 
and the other does not:  
[SWF] is a form of disjunctivism in that it concedes that the content of 
visual experience in the hallucinatory case is different from the content of 
visual experience in the veridical case. At the level of content itself, there 
is indeed no common factor. For each experience, there is but a single 
admissible content, but this content is different in veridical and in 
hallucinatory cases (Tye, 2009, 94). 
Thus, Tye argues that he is able to hold onto the particularity of experience by 
using his SWF thesis.  
Tye is offering his SWF thesis as a way to hold onto the particularity of 
experience because in cases of veridical and illusory experience, we are in 
“perceptual contact” with particular objects in our environment in that the objects 
are constituents of the content. Thus, though veridical and illusory experiences 
differ in that the former represents accurately a certain particular object having 
properties while the latter represents a certain particular object having properties 
it doesn't have, they nevertheless are similar in that they have particular objects 
among their constituents. Thus, they both differ from cases of hallucination where 
there is no particular object in the content of experience.  
Tye’s SWF thesis is a “disjunctivist” approach to perceptual content that is 
meant to hold onto the idea that perception puts us in “contact” with mind-
                                                 
7  It is important to note that, though Tye thinks the contents of perception should be analyzed in 
terms of Russellian singular propositions, Tye does not think it is plausible that thoughts should 
be too. According to Tye, there is a fineness of grain to thoughts that Russellian singular 
propositions cannot explain. (2009, 208). Thus, according to Tye, while the contents of 
perception may be singular propositions, the contents of thoughts are not necessarily. 
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independent objects. Later, I will present some worries that the SWF thesis of 
content does not in fact do justice to the particularity of experience. Before coming 
to those worries though, we need to look at a worry Tye himself think puts 
pressure on his view. This is the problem of veridical hallucination. 
3.3. The Problem of Veridical Hallucination 
 Tye admits that a major worry for his SWF thesis as it stands is that it seems 
unable to cope with cases of veridical hallucinations. Veridical hallucinations are 
cases where a hallucination represents the world correctly. For example, imagine 
the following case: in front of you there is a red bouncy ball resting on the floor. 
You are looking right at the ball and thus see the ball and that it is red, bouncy, at 
rest, and so on. Furthermore, imagine that, as you are looking at the ball, an evil 
demon begins to affect your brain. The demon affects your brain in such a way 
that you no longer can see the ball (e.g. the light reflected from the ball and onto 
your retina is somehow stopped at the retina or not processed by your brain in 
some way). At the same time however, the demon causes your brain to function 
in such a way that it seems to you as if you are still seeing the ball (that is, he excites 
the synapses usually active during cases of seeing red balls). Thus, from your point 
of view, you notice no difference. One moment you are looking at a red ball, the 
next minute you a hallucinating a red ball, but the transition is seamless—you are 
not aware that any change has taken place.  
In such a case as this, the hallucination is veridical because it represents that 
there is a red bouncy ball in front you, and there is in fact a red bouncy ball in front 
of you. But it is a hallucination because you are not actually seeing that ball, 
because the demon is preventing that from occurring. This is because, on the SWF 
thesis, if the object is not a constituent part of the content of experience, then one 
 54 
does not experience the object. Thus you are not having a visual experience of that 
ball and thus you are not perceiving that ball. Nevertheless, the content of the 
experience is, at least prima facie, accurate in the sense that it represents the world 
being some way, and the world is that way. Therefore, the hallucination is 
veridical.  
Michael Tye’s SWF theory seems to struggle to respect the intuition that the 
hallucination experienced is veridical. Veridical hallucination puts pressure on the 
SWF thesis because in order for the hallucination to be veridical, it must accurately 
represent the way the world is, but if hallucinations do not have particular objects 
as their constituents, then, according to Tye, the content of a veridical hallucination 
cannot be singular, but rather, must be general. So if we agree that there can be 
cases of veridical hallucination, then this is problematic for the SWF thesis because 
there cannot be only content that is singular when filled. Consequently, one might 
then conclude that, even if we grant that the content of experience is singular in 
cases of perception, there must be another level of content that is general or 
existential in order to account for veridical hallucinations.  
Tye recognizes and addresses this problem of veridical hallucinations. He 
argues that we should not be persuaded to adopt another layer of existential 
content on top of singular content. Instead, a proper understanding of “gappy” 
content can account for veridical hallucination. Here is how he phrases it:  
My visual experience has gappy content—a content with a gap in it where 
a seen object should go along with such properties as blueness, roundness, 
and bounciness. But this gappy content disposes me to believe that there 
is something blue, round, and bouncing. Cases of veridical hallucination 
are veridical, then, only to the extent that the visual experiences they 
involve dispose their subjects to form true beliefs. The experiences 
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themselves, however, are falsidical, or at best neither true nor false (2009, 
92). 
Tye notes there are two brief caveats to this claim. First, it does not entail that if 
something appears P to me, then I do believe that P. The second caveat is that Tye 
refuses to offer an analysis of how to cash out the disposition. The reason for the 
first caveat is that otherwise the proposal is too strong. Evidence Tye cites for this 
is the Muller-Lyer Illusion where something appears P but we don't believe that 
P. But if we went on the content of the experience alone, we might have believed 
that P. As for the second caveat, Tye argues that explaining dispositions can be 
done, but he does not offer a particular way to do it. 
According to Tye, the upshot of his SWF view of veridical hallucinations is 
it makes sense of the intuitive idea that things can visually appear to me to be a 
certain way in the sense that it disposes me to believe things are that way without 
that way being part of the content. For example, in looking around my living room, 
my experience may represent various objects such as a sofa, a bookcase, and a 
coffee-table. This content can dispose me to believe that there are fewer objects 
than 100, even though I do not have a thought with a numerical content. Nor does 
that content have to attach to my visual experience itself as visual contents, 
according to Tye. Tye claims “the relevant contents are potential cognitive contents 
and not actual visual contents of my experience” (Tye, 2009, 92). The proposal Tye 
is making is that there can be contents of thoughts and beliefs that are not part of 
the content of a perceptual experience, but are nevertheless dependent in some 
way on the visual experience.  
We can perhaps gloss this dependence either as causal or justificatory. This 
epistemic gloss is going beyond what Tye himself claims, but it is perhaps a 
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natural way to spell out his view. We can then say, Tye may have meant that 
certain experiences, in certain circumstances, may cause me to believe certain 
things; or, certain experiences, in certain circumstances, may provide justification 
for certain beliefs. The gappy content does not actually have the same content that 
the belief has, but nevertheless the belief content in some way depends on the 
content or the perceptual experience. 
The general shape of Tye’s response seems on the right track. For in cases 
of hallucination, something seeming some way is an epistemic notion. Seeming is 
not necessarily a notion tied to perceptual appearance. So, though the ways things 
seem does not match the representational content of the experience, things can 
nevertheless seem to be a certain way. 
Are there other issues with this approach to veridical hallucinations? One 
worry you might have is that if hallucinations are understood as propositional 
functions (that is, “content-schemas”), then they are not the sorts of things that are 
truth-evaluable. For, if there is no object in the case of hallucination, then a 
proposition does not result. Consequently, the propositional function cannot map 
an object to a truth value because there is no object. If the propositional function 
cannot map the object to a truth value, then there is no proposition that results to 
be truth-evaluable. If there is no truth-evaluable proposition in the experience, 
then the experience cannot be evaluated as either true or false. If the experience 
cannot be evaluated as true or false, how does it have the potential to cause or 
justify truth-evaluable thought contents?  
The problem with this objection is that Tye could argue that the subject of 
the veridical hallucination has internalist grounds for being justified in having the 
beliefs he does. That is, the justification need not come from the external mind-
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independent objects. As I mentioned above, the seemings of hallucination can be 
given an epistemic gloss. And if that is right, then the beliefs a subject has from a 
hallucination need not be justified or caused by the contents of experience. This 
fits well with Tye’s claim that hallucinations can be understood as “at best, neither 
true nor false” (2009, 92). Thus, as Tye claims,  
It may be replied that what I am calling “gappy propositions” or “gappy 
contents” for cases of hallucination are not really contents at all, on the 
grounds that they are not truth-evaluable or accuracy-evaluable. But this 
would be too hasty. As I noted earlier, the thought that this is a china frog 
is plausibly classified as false in the case that there is no china frog even 
though it has a gappy content. Why not take the same view for 
hallucinatory experiences (and for essentially the same reasons)? This also 
fits with the intuitive idea that hallucinatory experiences are inaccurate: 
the world is not as it seems to the person who is hallucinating (2009, 82).  
Of course, in cases of veridical hallucination the hallucination is accurate. 
Nevertheless, Tye’s point is that his notion of gappy content respects the plausible 
intuition that hallucinations are accurate/inaccurate. According to Tye, we don’t 
need to posit something like another layer of existential content on top of singular 
content to explain the intuition that hallucinations are accurate/inaccurate. The 
gappy content disposes me to have certain beliefs about the world. It is because 
the content is gappy that it is a hallucination, and it is because this gappy content 
disposes me to have true beliefs that it is a veridical hallucination. The SWF theory 
then, can account for veridical hallucinations.  
This detour into veridical hallucination may seem unrelated to the 
acquaintance hypothesis that Tye suggests helps us solve the Mary puzzle, but as 
will be shown below, gappy contents seem to conflict with knowledge by 
acquaintance. Moreover, the motivations Tye cites for gappy contents, namely 
holding onto the particularity of experience, is better motivation, or so I will argue, 
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for a relationist approach to perception. While it may seem that this examination 
of why Tye posits both the SWF thesis and gappy contents is unrelated to the 
knowledge argument, I will show below that it has consequences that for the 
acquaintance hypothesis to the knowledge argument.  
3.4 The Phenomenal Character of Experience 
 According to Tye, what Mary is acquainted with when she sees red for the 
first time is the phenomenal character of red. What is phenomenal character? 
Originally, Tye (1995) held the view that the phenomenal character is identical to 
the representational content of experience. Recently, Tye (2009) has rejected this 
identity claim and thus his old position of “representationalism” (Tye 2009). The 
argument he gives for rejecting it has important consequences for the acquaintance 
hypothesis. So we will look at the argument briefly. 
Tye formulates his argument against representationalism as follows: 
[Premise One:] No veridical and (non-veridical, non de re) hallucinatory 
experience share the same representational content. 
[Premise Two:] Some veridical and (non-veridical, non de re) hallucinatory 
experiences have the same phenomenal character.  
 Therefore,  
[Conclusion:] Phenomenal character is not the same as representationa l 
content   
(Tye, 2009, 112).  
Tye argues that, what I have labelled “Premise One”, follows from the SWF theory 
of perception laid out above. A non-veridical and non de re hallucination would be 
something such as visually experiencing that there is a glass of milk before me on 
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the desk, when in reality there is no such glass on my desk. This is different than 
a case of seeing a glass of milk on my desk where there is actually a glass of milk 
on my desk. 8 In this latter case, the experience is veridical because the glass of 
milk exists as my experience represents it to be, and it is de re because that 
particular glass of milk enters into the contents of my experience. Thus, these two 
experiences have different representational contents because in the case of 
hallucination what is represented has no glass of milk as a constituent, whereas in 
the case of seeing the milk one does have a glass of milk as its constituent.  
Premise Two, Tye argues, is the best way to account for phenomenal 
indistinguishability. By phenomenal indistinguishability I mean that, while it may 
be true that what the experience represents in cases of hallucination differs from 
what is represented in veridical experience, the two types of experience 
nevertheless seem the same from the subject’s point of view. That is, from 
introspection alone, the way things appear in each case cannot be distinguished. 
It is worth noting now, that as it stands, this view seems problematic 
because it has the consequence that being acquainted with an object does not affect 
the phenomenal character of the experience. This means that what is it like to see 
a particular red strawberry is not effected by acquaintance with that object—with 
that strawberry. This is because the object is part of the experience only at the level 
of content. But the phenomenal character can be the same across cases of veridical 
and hallucinatory experience, that is, when there both is and is not an object as 
part of the content, respectively. If the phenomenal character can be the same both 
when there is an object as part of the experience and when there is not an object as 
                                                 
8  I use the term “seeing” factively. That is, when a subject “sees” some object O, that object is 
taken to exist and the experience veridical. “Experience”, is used broadly to cover veridical 
cases of “seeing”, along with illusions and hallucinations.  
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part of the experience, then the object plays no role in determining the phenomenal 
character. I will explore this objection more below. For now, we need to continue 
spelling out the details of Tye’s view of phenomenal character. 
As discussed above, Tye rejects his old view of phenomenal character, but 
what does Tye now think phenomenal character is and how does he think we come 
to be acquainted with it? According to Tye’s new view, phenomenal character is a 
complex property of objects in the world: 
The phenomenal character of the experience of red is a thing (although not 
a concrete thing). Phenomenal characters can be compared. Some are more 
similar to one another than they are to others. In talking of my knowing 
the phenomenal character of a given experience, I am talking of knowing 
a certain thing—something you too can know. (Tye, 2009, 117). 
Tye further explains what he means when he argues that phenomenal character is 
a thing. More specifically, he says,  
the phenomenal character of experience is out there in the world. It is not 
a property of the experience at all. It is a complex of properties represented 
by the experience. In being aware of the external qualities, we are aware 
of phenomenal character. We are confronted by it (Tye, 2009, 119).  
Thus, according to Tye, phenomenal character is a complex of properties of a 
mind-independent material object. For those familiar with Tye’s arguments for 
representationalism, this might seem counter-intuitive. Phenomenal character is 
standardly taken to be ‘what it is like’ for a subject to undergo an experience. In 
being conscious, so the standard theory goes, the subject instantiates certain 
properties, namely ‘what it is like’ to be the conscious subject. These are often 
termed ‘phenomenal properties’. Furthermore, experiences are usually taken to be 
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events which the subject undergoes. From these claims, the standard argument is 
that:  
Phenomenal properties of the subject of that experience are fixed by the 
properties of those events. ‘Phenomenal character’ is then introduced as a 
term for that property of an experience which determines the phenomenal 
properties of the subject of that experience—which determines, that is, 
what it’s like for the subject of the experience (Speaks, 2013, 468).  
Speaks makes these claims in a discussion of Tye’s (2009) view of phenomenal 
character. Speaks takes this to be the general picture to which representational 
accounts of perception are committed, and accuses Tye of departing significantly 
from it. But whatever theory of perception one adopts, Speaks is right that the term 
‘phenomenal character’ has most usually been applied to subjects, not objects, both 
by representationalists and their dissenters. Moreover, since the meaning of 
“phenomenal” is to appear, and if there is no subject for this to appear to, then one 
might wonder what is the point of talking about phenomenal properties at all? 
This seems to be Speaks (2013) frustration and it is not without warrant. At a 
minimum, Tye needs to offer plausible reasons for using a well-worn term like 
“phenomenal character” in a new and very different way.  
 So why does Tye think phenomenal character is ‘out there in the world’? 
His main motivation for this, he says, is his commitment to the transparency of 
experience.  
[Transparency] tells us that in the case of perceptual experiences, the only 
qualities of which we are introspectively aware are qualities of external 
things if they are qualities of anything at all. But intuitively, we are aware 
of phenomenal character when we introspect. The conclusion to draw is 
that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience consists in, and 
is no more than, the complex of qualities the experience represents. Thus, 
the phenomenal character of the experience of red just is red. In being 
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aware of red, I am aware of what it is like to experience red, since what it 
is like to experience red is simply red (Tye, 2009, 119).  
What Tye is denying in this passage is the idea that when we introspect our 
experiences we can come to be aware of properties of those experiences 
themselves. Suppose, for instance, you are looking at a giant Christmas tree at 
Rockefeller Centre in New York City. You are amazed and speechless at how 
beautiful and large the tree is. What it is like for you to undergo that experience is 
truly remarkable for you. Now, if someone asked you, why do you feel that your 
experience is so remarkable? What is it about that experience that makes it 
remarkable? A natural way to respond is to introspect your experience in order to 
say what is so amazing. But to introspect your experience you must attend to the 
objects and the properties your experience is of. Perhaps after a few moments of 
introspection, you reply ‘it is the perfect combination of the colours of the 
Christmas lights, coupled with the magnificence of the size of the tree, that makes 
this experience so amazing’. But in so doing, all that you are reporting is properties 
of the objects themselves, and presumably this is because all that you can do to 
know what your experience is like via introspection is to attend to the external 
objects and properties your experience is of. Your experience is transparent to the 
objects you are experiencing.  
Now, If the phenomenal character of an experience is ‘out there in the 
world’, and if veridical experiences are singular propositions, then the 
phenomenal character seems to be playing the predicate role of the schematic 
portion of a singular proposition. For instance, in seeing a red strawberry, the 
propositional content is ‘this strawberry is red’. In giving the logical form of this 
proposition, the particular strawberry would be the subject—that is, the singular 
object onto which the property of redness is attributed. By contrast, the redness is 
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what is represented by the propositional function ‘is red’. But if this is right, if the 
phenomenal character is represented by the propositional function, and if what 
we are acquainted with are objects which play the subject role in the proposition, 
then the question arises, how can we be acquainted with a property that is 
attributed to the object, since it is the object that Tye’s theory of acquaintance tells 
us we have thing-knowledge of?  
One suggestion might be that a single experience may be analysable into 
propositions with different logical form. In seeing a red strawberry, the experience 
could be represented by a singular proposition where the object we are acquainted 
with is the material object (that is, the strawberry). But the experience could also 
be represented by a proposition where the object of the singular proposition is the 
property itself. In this case, it would be the redness of the strawberry that is the 
subject of the proposition.  
One reason Tye might think this is that he argues an experience must be 
epistemically enabling with respect to the item in question in order to have 
acquaintance with that item. That is to say, so long as one can wonder, ‘what is 
that?’ with respect to an item, one can have knowledge of that thing and therefore 
one is acquainted with that thing. Thus, if a given experience is such that either 
the material object, like the strawberry, or the property of the object, like the 
redness, are epistemically enabling, then the subject has acquaintance with that 
item.  
If this is right, then Tye seems able to avoid the worry as to how we can be 
acquainted with properties that are represented in the predicate position of the 
singular proposition. Thus, in having properties capable of being represented both 
in the subject and the predicate portion of a singular proposition, Tye has a 
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straightforward answer to our ability to be acquainted with the phenomenal 
character of colours.  
In sum, Tye’s view is that phenomenal character is a property of things. In 
seeing things in the world you are acquainted with particular things and their 
properties. By experiencing a particular thing, you are in direct contact with it. 
This applies as much to particular instances of phenomenal characters as it does 
to particular objects like tomatoes because phenomenal characters are properties 
of objects. Those particulars enter into the content of your experience such that 
you can form de re thoughts about them. Thus you can be acquainted with both 
particular objects as well as properties like phenomenal character.  
3.5 Challenges to Tye’s view: 
I have two challenges to Tye’s view of the SWF thesis and its coherence with 
knowledge by acquaintance. Each of these challenges is posed as a question that 
shows how Tye’s view, as it stands, is insufficient because his view does not have 
the resources to give an answer to the question posed. 
First Challenge: Is there a tension between the fact that knowledge by 
acquaintance is non-propositional, and the fact that the content of veridical 
perception is a singular proposition? Prima facie, if acquaintance requires 
experience, and experience has a structured content that is a singular proposition, 
then how can the knowledge acquired by perception be non-propositional?  
Tye claims that the purpose of his SWF thesis is to put us in “direct contact” 
with the objects of perception. However, that the perception has a singular 
proposition as its content does not seem adequate to capture the idea that 
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perception puts us in contact with mind-independent objects. Of course, the 
proposition or its determination must say how the object gets picked out, and a 
singular proposition might always pick out the correct object—it might always 
represent that particular object. But picking out the right object is not the same as 
being in perceptual contact with that object. Compare this with the idea that names 
always pick out the same person. In a proposition such as ‘David Cameron is 
Prime Minister’, the proposition is singular and has that particular person as its 
constituent. In the proposition, the name represents the particular object. But that 
is not obviously the same as the way perception makes us aware of particulars. 
The objects of a thought or assertion like ‘David Cameron is the Prime Minister’ 
has that proposition as its object. The proposition is the thing we believe or assert. 
And that proposition represents David Cameron. But when I am looking at David 
Cameron, when I see him, the object of my seeing is not a proposition, but a person. 
Propositions are abstract entities that are invisible. So it can’t be that the 
propositions are the objects of perception. Moreover, knowledge by acquaintance 
is a state that constitutes this awareness of this object. That’s what Tye mean by 
direct contact. But the issue then becomes how does this constitute object 
awareness? The awareness isn't the propositional content, only an aspect of the 
content, so there must be some refinement on how we get awareness of an aspect 
of the content. But how does it do this? By setting things up like this, Tye is 
assuming an explanatory commitment for his view, but he never discharges that 
assumption.  
 Second Challenge: How is the phenomenal character fixed? It seems 
unspecified by Tye how the phenomenal character gets fixed.  
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Recall that Tye’s view is that when we perceive an object and its attributes, 
we are acquainted with the object. This object, for instance the tomato in front of 
me, is in the subject role of the singular proposition. Its attributes—its shade of 
red, its circular shape, and so on—are specified by the predicates. We can be 
acquainted with the object without knowing or seeing any of its attributes. Does 
this mean we can be acquainted with the object without being acquainted with any 
of the attributes? Presumably this is so. Can we also be acquainted with the object 
and its attributes at the same time? It seems like Tye has to agree to this too because 
he says we are acquainted with the phenomenal character, and the phenomenal 
character is a property. But if that is the case, then the object is playing no role in 
fixing the phenomenal character.  
But if this is right, then what are we to make of the case of “Experienced 
Mary”? “Experienced Mary”, recall, is where she is still locked in her black-and-
white room and has not seen colours yet. We show her a red patch but don’t tell 
her it is red and so she doesn’t know it is red. Nevertheless, she is acquainted with 
the phenomenal character of red (according to Tye). In this case, what is the object 
and what is the attribute? There is just, it seems, the colour patch. But he says she 
is acquainted with the phenomenal character of red in this case. If the object plays 
no role in fixing the phenomenal character, then the phenomenal character of red 
can’t be the object, it has to be the attribute. This seems strange because it seems 
like in being shown a patch of red, Mary would plausibly wonder ‘what is that?’ 
(Tye’s ‘epistemically enabling' criteria). But if she is wondering ‘what is that?’ with 
respect to this red patch, it seems like the red patch is the subject in that thought. 
But the object that is in the subject role, we said, plays no role in fixing the 
phenomenal character. So the red patch can’t be in the subject role of that thought. 
So then what is in the subject role and what are we acquainted with? So should we 
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say we are acquainted with the attribute? but of what object? of a patch? Is that the 
object we are acquainted with? 
These are the two challenges that I think Tye’s view faces. To recap, I asked 
(i) how can you be acquainted with objects and have non-propositional knowledge 
of them if perception is propositional and (ii) how is the phenomenal character 
determined? They are problematic in that they show that Tye’s views on 
perception are in tension with his view on knowledge by acquaintance. However, 
I don’t think these challenges are necessarily devastating. There are perhaps non-
problematic things Tye could say in response. But, as it stands, Tye’s view seems 
too vague to withstand evaluation. We need to know more about how the 
phenomenal character is and is not fixed in these cases. If he wants to defend an 
acquaintance response to the knowledge argument, then he has to answer these 
challenges. Until then, one cannot fairly evaluate the plausibility of Tye’s views. 
In the next chapter, we will consider an alternative way of handling these 
challenges by looking at naive realist theories of perception.  
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Chapter 4: A Relationist Alternative 
4.1 Introduction  
 We ended the last chapter by noting some challenges Tye’s theory of 
perceptual content faces if it is to be compatible with his theory of knowledge by 
acquaintance. In particular, we questioned if Tye could adequately explain (i) how 
we have non-propositional knowledge and (ii) how the phenomenal character is 
fixed. Both of these worries stemmed from Tye’s theory of perceptual content. We 
noted furthermore that the motivation Tye cites for developing his SWF thesis of 
perceptual content was that it seemed to explain the way perception puts us in 
“direct contact” with mind-independent objects. In this chapter, I am going to 
argue that (i) the relationist theory of perception offers a better way to 
accommodate the idea that perception puts us in “direct contact” with the world, 
(ii) that the relationist can give a straightforward account of how we can have non-
propositional knowledge, and (iii) the relationist account gives an explanation of 
how we can account for our acquaintance with the phenomenal character of the 
world. I will also suggest that (iv) the relationist better respects the intuitions 
guiding Jackson’s knowledge argument for qualia. My main goal is to demonstrate 
that, if we want to be acquaintance theorists, then we should embrace a relationist 
theory of perception. Moreover, the relationist respects the central insights of 
Jackson’s knowledge argument in a way that Tye’s SWF thesis does not.  
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4.2 Relationism 
 In this section, I define the relationist view of perception and highlight how 
it is similar to early acquaintance theorists, like Russell, view on perception. I also 
briefly mention how it differs from Tye’s views on perception.  
To begin, let us get a clear working definition of the relationist theory of 
perception. A recent definition is as follows:  
When one genuinely perceives one’s environment, the phenomenal, 
conscious character of one’s experience is constituted, at least in part, by 
the mind-independent aspects of one’s environment that one perceives: 
the concrete mind-independent individuals, their properties, and the 
events they partake in. In this view, the conscious perceptual experience 
you have when you perceive the world is relational. The mind-
independent entities you perceive are constituents of that relation, and 
hence constituents of your experience (Soteriou, 2016, 65). 
And with respect to the phenomenal character of experience, another prominent 
relationist defines it thus:  
On a relational view, the qualitative character of the experience is 
constituted by the qualitative character of the scene perceived.…[on this 
view] experience of an object is a simple relation holding between the 
perceiver and the object (Campbell, 2002, 114-115).  
From these passages we can see that, according to the relationist, perception is a 
relation holding between the perceiver and the mind-independent entities.9 On the 
                                                 
9 One final note on terminology. It is important to note that I will be switching between the 
terms mind-independent “objects” and mind-independent “entities” throughout this chapter. I use 
the word “entities” as ontologically neutral and broadly to cover (at least) objects, properties, 
events, while I use “objects” for mind-independent particular concrete objects. This distinction is 
important because relationists hold that not only objects but in general entities can be what we bear 
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relationist view, perception presents mind-independent objects, it does not re-
present them.  
The relationist view of perception is similar to the original theory of 
knowledge by acquaintance, first proposed by Russell, in that both take perception 
to be a presentational relation. As I outlined in chapter two, according to Russell 
acquaintance is a direct relation between the subject and its object. He held that 
acquaintance is the converse of presentation (Russell, 1914). On Russell’s view, 
when an object is presented to the subject, a subject is acquainted with that object: 
Since we have decided that experience is constituted by a relation, it will 
be better to employ a less neutral word; we shall employ synonymously 
the two words “acquaintance” and “awareness”, generally the former. 
Thus when A experiences an object O, we shall say that A is acquainted 
with O (Russell, 1913, 35).  
 
Thus, on both the relationist’s view and on Russell’s original theory of 
acquaintance, experience is a relation where entities are presented to the subject. 
Moreover, those entities are constituents of your experience because you bear a 
relation to them.  
This is in contrast with Tye, who holds that the objects of perception are 
constituents of your experience because they are constituents of the 
representational content. But according to the relationist, the mind-independent 
objects that a subject perceives are not constituents of the experience because they 
are part of the representational content, because perception is not a representation 
                                                 
a relation to in experience. By contrast, on Tye’s SWF thesis, it is objects that fill the “gap” in the 
content of perception, and therefore are what we are, according to Tye, in “contact” with.  
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of mind-independent objects. Rather, according to the relationist, the mind-
independent objects that one perceives are constituents of that experience because 
they are constituents of the relation. Thus, according to the relationist, it is in being 
so related that a subject perceives mind-independent objects. 
This also differs from Tye’s view in that, for the relationist, the object of the 
relation constitutes the phenomenal character. That means that unless one bears a 
certain relation to the mind-independent entities, one cannot have the same 
phenomenal character. More specifically, on the relationist account, experience is 
a three place relation holding between, a subject, a point of view, and an object. 
This is important because obviously the same object can look a different way to 
the same subject just so long as his view point has changed. Thus, one can think of 
the viewpoint as the mode under which the object is presented. For instance, a 
particular building B may look, to subject S, to be a particular shade of white W, 
from a view of 10 meters away, V10. From a viewpoint that is 50 meters away, V50, 
the same building B may look to subject S to have a different shade of white or 
perhaps even a different hue. This different hue affects the phenomenal character 
of the experience. So, the determining of the phenomenal character depends on a 
three place relation that holds between the subject, the object, and the point of view 
to which the experience is relativized. 
The upshot of the relationist view is that when I perceive entities in the 
world, the phenomenal character of that experience is constituted by the entities 
themselves and the relation which I stand to them. For instance, when I perceive a 
red strawberry, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by the 
relation I bear to those entities, namely, by the relation I bear to the concrete object 
of the strawberry and to its property of redness. On the relationist view, it is 
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precisely because I bear a relation to an instance of redness that the experience has 
the particular phenomenal character it does have. This is important because, 
unlike on Tye’s view where the phenomenal character can be the same across cases 
of hallucination and veridical experience, the phenomenal character for the 
relationist is affected by the particular mind-independent entitles one bears a 
relation to. The phenomenal character of my experience is determined by the 
entities and the relation I bear to them. This explains why Mary could not know 
what the phenomenal character of red was like until she stood in the relation of 
visual experiencing red. I will elaborate more on this over the next few sections.  
4.3 Relationism and Tye’s SWF Thesis 
In this section, I show why the relationist does not face the challenges Tye’s 
SWF thesis does. In particular, I show how the relationist can explain how 
perception puts subjects in “direct contact” with mind-independent objects, and 
how the relationist view of perception is not in conflict with knowledge by 
acquaintance.  
 In previous chapters, we discussed Tye’s motivation to develop the SWF 
thesis. According to Tye, perception puts us in direct contact with objects in a way 
that hallucination does not. He claims that the best way to explain this is in terms 
of singular content. In the veridical perception, the objects of perception are 
constituent parts of their contents, while in hallucinations they are not. Thus, Tye 
glosses the issue of direct contact as an issue about singular perceptual content:  
Once it is acknowledged that the content of visual experience is singular 
in veridical cases, it must also be acknowledged that in cases of 
hallucination the content (if there is one) is not singular, for in these cases 
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there is no object with which the subject is in perceptual contact (Tye, 2009, 
78). 
 As we saw in the last chapter, it is not clear that thinking of the contents of 
perception in terms of singular propositions adequately respects the idea that we 
are in direct contact with objects. Of course, as Tye argues, using the SWF thesis, 
the particular objects are literally part of those representations, at least in veridical 
perception, and that puts us in contact with those objects. But that is not the same 
as saying that the subject is in direct contact with the object. For instance, consider 
reading a newspaper report with a singular proposition about David Cameron, 
such as “David Cameron steps down as Prime Minister”. The newspaper has this 
singular proposition and the content of that proposition represents a particular 
person. But that is not the same as perceiving David Cameron step down. To see 
him is to be in direct contact with him in a way that reading a newspaper is not.  
With the relationist account, direct contact can be explained in a more 
straightforward manner. As the quote from Campbell above highlights, for the 
relationist the experience just is the simple relation that puts us in contact with the 
mind-independent objects. Consequently, objects are presented, not re-presented in 
experience. In seeing David Cameron, I bear a relation to that particular object and 
its properties. I am in direct perceptual contact with these mind-independent 
entities because they are the objects that I am directly related to by the simple 
relation of perception. They are presented to me in experience. Thus, to explain how 
we bear direct contact with mind independent objects, we do not need to give an 
elaborate theory of representational content that is singular with objects as 
constituents. By conceiving of experience as a simple relation, we avoid the 
problem of how a representation can be the type of thing that puts us in contact 
with the objects. On top of avoiding the problems a theory of singular content 
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faces, the relationist theory also has the virtue of the simplicity of the theory and 
the straightforward nature of the explanation. If we can explain direct contact in a 
simple and straightforward manner, then we should. With the relationist theory 
of perception we can. So, I argue, we should.  
Similar reasoning applies to the issue of non-propositional knowledge. In 
developing his theory of knowledge by acquaintance, Tye argued that knowledge 
by acquaintance is a form of non-propositional and non-conceptual knowledge. It 
is knowledge of things, not of facts. The challenge of this approach for Tye was 
explaining how a subject could have such knowledge when the perceptual state 
that was supposed to enable that knowledge was itself propositional.  
On the relationist view, experience is not constituted by having a 
representational content that represents things. Rather, experience is a simple and 
direct relation to mind-independent objects. We have knowledge of things by 
being related to them in perception. There is no special worry about how such non-
propositional knowledge is gained in perception because relationist does not think 
perception is fundamentally a representational state. As such, the relationist 
account does not face the problem of giving an account of non-propositional 
representational content because perceptual states are not representational states. 
Since they are not representational states, there is no question of whether they are 
propositional representations or non-propositional representations, conceptual or 
non-conceptual representations. 
In sum, Tye has difficulty explaining how perception puts us in direct 
contact with mind-independent objects and how we can have non-propositional 
knowledge if perceptual content is a singular proposition. Both of these problems 
stem from his SWF thesis. By rejecting that perception is fundamentally a 
 75 
representational state, the relationist avoids these problems. Furthermore, by 
conceiving of the experience as a relation of presentation, the relationist has a 
straightforward answer to how perception puts us in direct contact with mind-
independent objects, and to how we can have knowledge by acquaintance.   
4.4 Relationism and the Acquaintance Relation  
 Relationists preserve a central insight of early acquaintance theorists like 
Russell, namely that perception is a presentational relation. But Russell was also a 
sense-data theorist, and his sense-data theory went hand-in-hand with his theory 
of acquaintance. Sense-data theory is often thought to face insuperable challenges 
(Tye, 2009). However, the relationist does not face the same challenges of the 
sense-data theorist. By accepting that experience is a relation of acquaintance, the 
relationist is not thereby committed to sense-data. Moreover, the differences 
between sense-data theorists and relationists make it possible for relationists to 
better explain the phenomenal character of experience, as I will explain in the next 
section. 
As we’ve said, acquaintance was first introduced by Russell as a relation, 
and nearly all philosophers defending some form of acquaintance have endorsed 
the relational nature of acquaintance, except of course, for Tye (2009) (Russell, 
1910-11; Fumerton and Hasan, 2014). Acquaintance, as it was originally 
understood, is a relation that obtains between a subject and an entity when that 
subject experiences that entity (Russell, 1910-11).10  This experience does not re-
present the entity, but presents it. Experience itself is the relation (Russell, 1913). 
Thus, knowledge by acquaintance is acquired by a subject having certain entities 
                                                 
10  I use “entity” as an ontologically neutral term that covers objects, properties, and relations. 
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presented to them via experience. In such a situation, the subject bears a relation 
to the object.  
I argued that it seems hard (though perhaps not impossible) to rephrase this 
situation in terms of representation without some loss of explanatory power. For 
instance, by making acquaintance representational in Tye’s sense, we face the 
unappealing consequence that we can be acquainted with an entity even if we have 
never actually encountered the entity in our environment. This is because, on Tye’s 
view, so long as the entity is represented in our experience, then we are acquainted 
with it, regardless of whether or not the entity is in our environment. This not only 
seems very implausible to me, but a distortion of the concept of acquaintance. The 
question to ask is, how can you be acquainted with something that you have never 
encountered in your environment? There is perhaps an explanation we could craft 
as to how, but in doing so we fail to respect the appeal to acquaintance in the first 
place. 
So it seems that if we want to defend an acquaintance hypothesis to the 
knowledge argument, then a relationist approach to experience is the best way. 
On the relationist view, knowledge by acquaintance is acquired by bearing the 
acquaintance relation—by experiencing—the mind-independent entity itself. Thus, 
when Mary sees red for the first time, she experiences the property red and thereby 
has knowledge by acquaintance of red. It is knowledge she could not have had in 
her black-and-white room because she had not bore the right relation to colours—
she had not experienced red. The knowledge she acquires is not propositional 
knowledge but knowledge of a thing, namely a sensible quality of the object. The 
relationist does not need to posit non-propositional content to explain knowledge 
by acquaintance precisely because experience is not fundamentally a matter of 
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representational content. Instead, it is a simple and direct relation to the things 
known. Thus, relationist theory of perception fits more naturally with the 
acquaintance hypothesis to the knowledge argument and with how early 
acquaintance theorist conceived of the nature of acquaintance. 
But though the relationist view of perception preserves a central insight of 
early 20th century acquaintance theorists, this is not to say that relationists and 
early 20th century acquaintance theorists like Russell do not have differences. One 
major difference is that early acquaintance theorists like Russell argued we are 
acquainted with sense-data (among other things), while contemporary relationists 
reject sense-data. Sense-data theorists can be seen to face insuperable problems. 
Does the relationist, by embracing the idea that experience is a relation of 
acquaintance, face any of the same problems? I argue no, relationists do not face 
the same insuperable problems of sense-data theorists.  
For Russell, it is sense-data that we bear a direct relation of acquaintance to, 
and it is these items that are constituents of our experiences. For instance, in seeing 
a brown table, one is not directly acquainted with the table itself, but rather by the 
sense-data that are caused by that table (Russell, 1912). As such, you can only know 
that table by making inferences based on the sense-data for which you are directly 
acquainted with.11 
                                                 
11  While it is true relationists do not endorse the ontology of sense-data, the history of sense-data is complex 
with sense-data theorists changing their minds about what they took the exact ontological nature of sense-
data to be, so we have to be careful in spelling out the exact differences between sense-data theorists and 
relationists. For instance, early in the career of Russell sense-data were not considered mind-dependent 
data, though towards the end of his career he had come to think of them as mind-dependent. Likewise, 
early in the career of Moore sense-data was somewhat of a place holder for ‘whatever it is that we are 
acquainted with when we have experiences’, though later he moved to a view closer in line with the later 
views of Russell. So if we are talking about sense-data in the way early Moore and early Russell did, 
namely as whatever object we are acquainted with in perception (and not necessarily as mind-dependent), 
then it’s not clear the relationist will dissent too much from these views. See Kalderon (2012) and Martin 
(2015) for discussion of contemporary relationists and early sense-data theorists.  
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Sense-data theorists aimed to give a theory of the sense-data of 
acquaintance that covered all forms of experience, not just perception. Sense data 
theorists argued that the sense-data of which we are aware in cases of perception, 
illusion, and hallucination, are all of the same nature. The type of thing we are aware 
of in hallucination is the same type, ontologically speaking, of thing we are aware 
of in perception. 
By contrast, relationists are committed to experiential pluralism, which is just 
the denial of experiential monism (Kalderon 2012). According to those committed 
to experiential pluralism, such as the relationist, while perception may be a sensory 
mode of awareness, this is not part of the nature of all sense experience. Thus, 
relationists differ from sense-data theorists primarily in that relationists reject the 
experiential monism that many sense-data theorists held.12 
The upshot of the relationists rejection of experiential monism is that it 
avoids commitment to some form of phenomenalism that sense-data theories 
eventually morphed into (Kalderon 2012). Thus, rather than being related to some 
red sense-data that is the object with which you are acquainted—an object which 
is the same thing you can be related to in a case of hallucination—it is the mind-
independent objects, properties, and events, that a subject bears a relation to, 
according to the relationist. In seeing a brown table, one is aware of a property of 
that particular table, namely its brownness. This instance of brownness is a 
property of the table, that is, of a mind-independent material object. Subjects bear 
a relation to that property, not a sense-data caused by the brown table. Thus, the 
                                                 
12  See Kalderon (2012) for more on the distinction between experiential monism and experiential pluralism.  
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relationist preserves a central insight of early acquaintance theorists while at the 
same time rejecting the questionable ontology of sense-data.  
4.5 Qualia and Phenomenal Character 
 In chapter one we discussed how Jackson’s knowledge argument was 
supposed to show not only that physicalism was false, but that qualia exist. We 
also briefly discussed the differences between Jackson’s conception of experience 
as involving qualia and Nagel’s conception of experience as involving a subjective 
‘what it is like’ element. Moreover, in discussing Tye’s theory in the last few 
chapters, we have also explored how conceptions of experience are often framed 
in a debate about the phenomenal character of experience. Michael Tye argued 
that what Mary comes to know by acquaintance is the phenomenal character of 
red.  
In this section, I take a closer look at the nature of qualia and phenomenal 
character in order to show how a relationist can, where a representationa list 
cannot, explain the central insights of Jackson’s initial argument for qualia without 
thereby committing himself to non-physical mental properties. To show this, I look 
at the way representationalists have used the argument from transparency against 
qualia theorists. I then show how relationists can use this argument against 
representationalists too. I conclude by arguing that even though the relationists 
reject qualia and accept the argument from transparency, they nevertheless can 
preserve one of the central epistemic consequences of qualia theory. This, I 
suggest, makes the relationist view a more attractive position than the 
representationalist.  
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After presenting the knowledge argument, Jackson (1982) concludes there 
are qualia, which are non-physical. While Jackson understood qualia as features 
of mental states that cannot be known by knowing all the physical information, 
the definition and nature of qualia has since been contested, even by qualia 
theorists themselves.13 One way qualia has been frequently thought of is as the 
intrinsic, non-representational properties of the subject (Soteriou 2013). 
Importantly, understanding them this way leaves out whether they are physical 
or not. Defining qualia this way is a consequence of the debates between qualia 
theorists and representationalists that have emerged since (but not necessarily 
because of) Jackson’s knowledge argument. In debates between qualia theorists 
and representationalists, the debate has been about whether or not qualia can be 
explained and/or reduced to the representational contents of experience. Qualia 
theorists argue that they cannot, and that any theory of the phenomenal character 
of experience must acknowledge the contribution of these qualia make to the 
overall phenomenal character of the experience. By contrast, representationa list 
theories argue that they can be so reduced or explained.  
Before turning to the debate between qualia theorists and 
representationalists, we need to spell out in a little more detail the view of the 
qualia theorist. Following Crane and French (2015), we can classify theories of 
perception on two levels. On the first level, a theory of perception makes a claim 
about what the nature or structure of perception fundamentally is. On the second 
level, a theory of perception makes a claim about how the nature or structure of 
perception grounds or explains the phenomenal character. In grouping things this 
way, we can get different versions of representationalism and qualia theories. For 
                                                 
13  See Tye (2015) for an essay cataloguing the different definitions. See Martin (1998) for skepticism that 
“qualia” picks out any unique target. 
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instance, a well-known qualia theory is proposed by Ned Block (1990, 2003) where 
he rejects the claim that the phenomenal character can be explained solely in terms 
of representational content. This is a claim about the second level and it 
differentiates his theory from many representationalist theories, such as Tye (1995) 
and Byrne (2001). Nevertheless, Block’s theory does not deny that perception has 
representational content. For Block, perception is, at bottom, a non-relational 
representation of the world. Thus, depending on how we organize the debates, 
certain theories will be classified now one way, then another.  
The thesis of transparency has frequently been used by representationalists 
to argue against qualia theorists (see especially, Harman (1990), Dretske (1995), 
and Tye (1995, 2002)). When the representationalist appeals to the thesis of 
transparency, he is doing so to defend a view about the second level of perception, 
not the first.14 In his argument, Harman (1990), provides a classic statement of the 
argument from transparency. Harman claims that we must be very careful to 
distinguish between properties of what is represented and properties of the 
representation. He uses an analogy with paintings to make his point. An oil 
painting of a unicorn, for instance represents a unicorn with four legs. What is 
represented has the property of having four legs. The representation itself, that is 
the painting, does not have the property of having four legs. Similarly, the painting 
has the property of being made by oil, the unicorn does not (Harman 1990, 35). 
Thus, there is a distinction between the object represented and the vehicle of 
representation. These two things do not necessarily share the same properties.  
                                                 
14 By contrast, as I will urge below, the relationist can use this same appeal to transparency 
to argue against the representationalist about the first level.  
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Harman claims that mental states with representational content have a 
similar distinction, for instance, a visual experience of a tree represents a tree of a 
certain height, say ten meters. Your experience is not ten meters tall. It does not have 
that property. Nevertheless, the object represented has that property. The tree in 
your experience is represented as having the property of being ten meters tall.  
Harman argues that mental states with representational content are 
transparent in a way that an oil paintings are not: 
I want to argue that she is not aware of those intrinsic features of her 
experience by virtue of which it has that content. Indeed, I believe that she 
has no access at all to the intrinsic features of her mental representat ion 
that make it a mental representation of seeing a tree. Things are different 
with paintings. In the case of a painting, Eloise can be aware of those 
features of the painting that are responsible for its being a painting of a 
unicorn. That is, she can turn her attention to the pattern of the paint on 
the canvas by virtue of which the painting represents a unicorn. But in the 
case of her visual experience of a tree, I want to say that she is not aware 
of, as it were, the mental paint by virtue of which her experience is an 
experience of seeing a tree. She is aware only of the intentional or 
relational features of her experience, not of its intrinsic non-intentiona l 
features (Harman, 1990, 39).  
The thesis of transparency says that what you are aware of in experiences 
are properties of the things represented, not properties of the representation. In 
paintings, one can be aware of the properties of the painting—the type of paint 
used etc.—that are used to create the representation. A similar claim is made about 
perception. For instance, in vision, you are not aware of the properties of the 
representation—the “mental paint”—only of the properties of what is represented. 
Thus, the thesis of transparency is that experiences are transparent in the sense that 
you ‘look through them’, so to speak, to the things represented. That is, in 
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experience you are not aware of the intrinsic properties of the representation, only 
of the properties of the things represented.  
The thesis of transparency has been popular among representationalists as 
a way to argue against qualia theorists, and Tye has been one of the more vocal 
supporters of this thesis. The argument is that upon introspection you are not 
aware of any qualia or intrinsic non-representational properties of your 
experience. Therefore, ‘what it is like’ for you to have an experience—the 
phenomenal character of an experience—is explained fully in terms of the 
representational properties of the experience. Qualia theorists like Ned Block have 
denied this, arguing that you are in fact aware of “mental paint”.  
Representationalists have been insistent that the argument from 
transparency shows that the phenomenal character of experience can be explained 
solely in terms of the experience’s representational properties. But I think that 
representationalists have not followed through the argument of transparency to 
its full conclusion. That is, instead of thinking that the thesis of transparency shows 
that there are only representational properties of experience, the thesis of 
transparency shows that all we are aware of are mind-independent objects and 
their properties themselves. As Soteriou phrased the argument from transparency,  
For one finds that one cannot single out introspectively the qualities of 
experience that one should expect to discover if the qualia theory were 
correct. Rather, one instead discerns the quality that one would expect to discover 
if the naive realist account of the phenomenal character were correct (Soteriou, 
2016, 97, my emphasis).  
The point is that introspection on our experience of the colour red not only shows 
that there are no qualia, but also that all we are aware of are properties of mind-
independent objects. It is the colour red, a property of a mind-independent object, 
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that we are aware of in introspection. We are not aware of a representational 
content with objects as its constituents. That is a further claim that must be argued 
for. The representationalist assumes that if transparency showed there was no 
qualia, then, by default, their view would be correct. This is because both qualia 
theorists like Block and representationalists like Tye appear to believe that 
experience is at bottom a non-relational representation. But the relationist denies 
this. Moreover, the thesis of transparency seems to support the relationists because 
introspection makes us aware of mind-independent objects and their properties. 
It does not make us aware of any representational content. Thus, the relationist 
explains the phenomenology of our experience in a more accurate manner than 
either the qualia theorist or the representationalist.  
The advantage that the relationist has over the representationalist, aside 
from fitting the phenomenology better, is that they can respect the epistemic role 
of phenomenal character of experience that the qualia theorist seems committed 
to. Qualia theorists claim not only that ‘what it is like’ to have an experience cannot 
be fully explained in terms of its representational content, but also that there is 
something distinctive about experience that we could only know by having that 
experience. What it is like to see red, they argue, can only be known by seeing red. 
This is present both in Jackson’s version of qualia as non-physical mental features, 
but also in qualia theorists like Block who are reluctant to think of qualia as non-
physical. Thus, qualia theorists give a certain epistemic role to qualia. The 
relationist accepts this epistemic role of the phenomenal character of experience, 
but does not accept qualia. According to the relationist, 
The intuition that there is a distinctive form of knowledge that is made 
available to Mary when she leaves her black and white room and 
consciously perceives the colour red for the first time, is sound. The 
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intuition that the phenomenal character of Mary’s experience makes 
available that distinctive form of knowledge is also sound. But, [the 
relationist] argues, reflection on the phenomenology of experience shows 
that the qualia theorists attempt to accommodate those intuitions fails 
(Soteriou, 2016, 97). 
According to the relationist, the qualia theorist fails to accommodate the epistemic 
role of experience because they violate the thesis of transparency. While it is true 
that the phenomenal character has a special epistemic role, it is not true that this 
entails there are qualia. This is because introspection does not make us aware of 
qualia, but only of mind-independent objects and their properties. The relationist 
can straightforwardly hold on to the intuitions of the qualia theorist that there is 
an epistemic role for qualia, and they can do this without appealing to qualia. 
Relationist argue that it is because of the relation that obtains in having the 
experience that accounts of the epistemic role. In having such an experience, a 
subject is related to mind-independent objects and their properties. This relation 
and the objects the subject is related to determines the phenomenal character of 
the subject’s experience. As such, the relationist differs in a significant way from 
the qualia theorist, because they can respect the intuitions driving the qualia 
theorist, in particular Jackson’s theory of qualia as it relates to the knowledge 
argument. But they can do this in a way that posits no non-physical entities. 
The relationist then, claims both (i) the qualia theorist is right to argue that 
there is a special epistemic role for the phenomenal character of experience, and 
that (ii) the representationalist is right to appeal to the thesis of transparency as an 
argument that there is no such thing as qualia. The result is that the relationist can 
respect the insights of both theories, while avoiding the problems they face.  
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4.6 Sensation and Cognition: A Final Diagnosis  
What seems to be a central underlying issue between all these theories of 
perception—qualia theorist, representationalist, and relationist—is the differences 
and similarities between sensation and cognition. For instance, it has been noted 
that this is at issue between the representationalist and qualia theorist:  
One concern to which such accounts [representationalism] give rise is 
whether they end up making sensory experience too thought-like, and in 
particular, whether they fail to accommodate the distinctive sensuous 
character of conscious sensory experience. The debate that is framed in 
terms of the question of the relation between an experience’s 
representational properties and its phenomenal character can be seen as 
engaging with these concerns (Soteriou, 2013, 29).  
By conceiving of experience as having a representational content, 
representationalists face the problem of not accounting for the distinctiveness of 
sensory states.  
We already discussed this problem in Tye’s account where he had to 
conceive of the nature of representational content of experience in very different 
terms than the representational content of thought. He did this by arguing that the 
representational content of experience is non-propositional and non-conceptual, 
whereas the content of thought is propositional and conceptual. Thus, one can see 
the complaint against representationalists as that of failing to respect the difference 
between the sensory and the cognitive when they attribute a representational 
content with veridicality conditions to sensory experience.  
 Representational content with veridicality conditions is a model that was 
originally aimed at explaining thought and language. By transferring this model 
to sensory consciousness we fail to do justice to the distinctively sensory nature of 
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phenomenal consciousness. In particular, if we rely on a model of sense experience 
which puts representational content at the centre, then we will fail to explain in 
any satisfying manner the phenomenal character of experience. 
A similar worry, I argue, is present in Jackson’s knowledge argument. That 
is, one way to understand what Jackson is highlighting with the case of Mary is 
that sensory experience is very different from thought. What can be grasped by 
sensory experience cannot necessarily be grasped by thought. In her black-and-
white room, Mary is capable of performing many cognitive tasks with respect to 
colours. She can, for instance, think about colours, form judgements about colours, 
test theories about colours, and generally perform many other cognitive tasks with 
respect to colours.15 In terms of what Mary can know about colours, it seems her 
capacities are more or less limited to cognitive capacities. Thus, one of the things 
the Mary puzzle highlights is that her psychological capabilities are limited such 
that they exclude sensory capabilities with respect to coloured objects.  
The difficulty of the Mary puzzle is in articulating what exactly it is that 
Mary lacks before she sees colours. We must ask what is it that the sensory 
experience of red or redness makes available for Mary, and why? And why are these 
capabilities unavailable to her before she experiences red or redness? Thus, the 
knowledge argument is a puzzle as much about the similarities and differences 
between thought and experience, between the cognitive and the sensory, as much 
as it is a puzzle about physicalism and qualia. 
We can see this complaint about the cognitive and the sensory as 
underpinning Tye’s acquaintance hypothesis. We can see this in the way that he 
                                                 
15 This is not to imply that she can perform only cognitive tasks. For instance, she surely 
can be in emotional or desirous states with respect to colours.  
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articulates knowledge by acquaintance as a form of knowledge that is non-
conceptual and non-propositional. This differs precisely from the essential 
structure usually attributed to thought contents, namely propositional and 
conceptual. Moreover, on Tye’s account, this new type of knowledge can only be 
acquired by being experienced, and this experience gives acquaintance with the 
phenomenal character of the things experienced. Thus, I suggest we see Tye’s 
theory as working from a similar underlying worry about the differences between 
the cognitive and the sensory, a worry familiar from qualia theorists' complaint 
about representationalism about phenomenal character. 
With this in mind, we can reformulate our diagnosis of what is wrong with 
Tye’s view. Tye’s view is in tension with itself because, on the one hand, he strives 
to make sensory experience and knowledge by acquaintance distinctive from 
thought, but, on the other hand, he refuses to give up the notion that all 
experiences are at bottom representational. The result is an unstable position. The 
tension could be released in one of two ways. First, by making sense experience 
more thought like, (e.g. by giving up on either non-conceptual content or non-
propositional content or both), but then he might lose his physicalist response to 
the knowledge argument. Second, by giving up on the claim that experiences have 
representational content. Given the motivations Tye cites for developing his 
Singular When Filled thesis, namely that the goal of perception is to put us into 
contact with the items in our environment, I respectfully suggest he should give 
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